## Facts

- N.R., a kindergarten student, attended W.C. Bryant Elementary School in Philadelphia and was in teacher Reginald Littlejohn’s classroom.
- An adult, Christina Regusters, entered the school and went to N.R.’s classroom to remove the child from school.
- School policy required a student to be released only after presentation of identification and verification of authorization.
- Regusters allegedly refused or failed to provide identification or proof of authorization.
- Littlejohn nonetheless allegedly allowed N.R. to leave with Regusters.
- Regusters was a stranger to N.R. and was not authorized by the parent or school to take the child.
- After leaving school, Regusters sexually assaulted N.R., causing severe physical and emotional injuries; the child was later found outdoors by a sanitation worker.
- N.R.’s parent sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation under the “state-created danger” doctrine.
- The district court denied Littlejohn’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds; defendants pursued an interlocutory appeal on the pleadings.

## Issues

1. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged that the teacher’s affirmative act of releasing a kindergartener to an unidentified and unauthorized adult violated substantive due process under the Third Circuit’s state-created danger doctrine.
2. Whether the asserted right was clearly established in 2013 such that the teacher was not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed the order denying qualified immunity.
- Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the court held that the pleadings stated a substantive due process claim under the state-created danger doctrine.
- The court held that the child’s right to be free from exposure by her teacher to an obvious danger was clearly established at the time of the incident.
- The case was permitted to proceed beyond the pleading stage.

## Legal Principles

- A substantive due process claim may proceed under a state-created danger theory when: (1) harm is foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the state actor’s culpability shocks the conscience; (3) the plaintiff is a foreseeable victim due to a sufficiently close relationship; and (4) the state actor affirmatively used authority to create or increase the danger.
- On a motion to dismiss, courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and assess only whether they plausibly state a claim.
- “Conscience-shocking” culpability may be shown by deliberate indifference to a known or obvious risk, particularly where a vulnerable child is placed in harm’s way.
- Qualified immunity is unavailable if the complaint alleges (1) a constitutional violation and (2) violation of a right that was clearly established such that a reasonable official would have understood the conduct to be unlawful; factually identical precedent is not required when the danger and unlawfulness are obvious.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit held that a teacher’s alleged decision to release a kindergartener to a stranger who refused to provide identification or authorization plausibly constituted an affirmative, conscience-shocking act that foreseeably and directly increased the child’s risk of harm, and that the child’s right to be free from such obvious danger was clearly established, defeating qualified immunity at the pleading stage.


L.R. v. School District of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2016)