## Facts

- Luck’s Music Library, Inc. rented and sold classical orchestral sheet music, and Moviecraft, Inc. preserved, restored, and sold archival film footage.
- The companies had used certain foreign works in the United States on the assumption that those works were in the U.S. public domain.
- In 1994, Congress enacted § 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), codified mainly at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A and 109, to implement Article 18 of the Berne Convention.
- Section 514 restored U.S. copyright in certain foreign works that had entered the U.S. public domain for reasons such as: (i) the United States previously did not recognize copyrights from the source country, (ii) the rightsholder failed to satisfy U.S. formalities, or (iii) federal law had not covered certain older sound recordings.
- Luck’s (and Moviecraft) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that § 514 exceeded Congress’s power under the Copyright and Patent Clause because it withdrew works from the public domain and did not create incentives to make new works.
- The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Constitution contains no categorical bar against copyright restoration; plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Does URAA § 514 exceed Congress’s authority under the Copyright and Patent Clause by restoring copyright in foreign works that had previously entered the U.S. public domain?
2. Does the Copyright and Patent Clause impose a categorical constitutional rule that Congress may not remove works from the public domain?

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and upheld URAA § 514 as constitutional.
- The court held the Copyright and Patent Clause does not impose a categorical prohibition on Congress restoring copyright to works previously treated as public-domain material in the United States.
- Drawing on Eldred v. Ashcroft, the court reasoned that Congress may legislate for existing works as well as new works, so long as it stays within the Clause’s textual limits (including limited times).
- The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that a copyright statute must supply a substantial, immediate incentive for the creation of the very works affected; Congress may rationally conclude that the prospect of future restoration (or similar measures) can affect expected returns and thus influence future creative investment.
- The court declined to treat patent-law language (notably dictum from Graham v. John Deere about “remov[ing] existent knowledge from the public domain”) as controlling in copyright, stressing doctrinal differences between patent and copyright and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Eldred.
- The court accepted Congress’s international objectives—implementing Berne Article 18 and seeking reciprocal foreign protection for U.S. authors—as permissible goals within Congress’s copyright authority.

## Legal Principles

- The Copyright and Patent Clause grants Congress broad policy discretion in copyright legislation, constrained by the Clause’s text rather than a judge-made, per se “public domain” lock-in rule.
- A statute does not fall outside the Copyright and Patent Clause merely because it addresses existing works; Congress may regulate existing works if it otherwise acts within constitutional bounds.
- Patent-specific dicta about keeping prior knowledge in the public domain do not automatically translate into a constitutional rule for copyright.
- Congress may consider international copyright arrangements (including implementing treaty obligations and seeking reciprocal treatment abroad) when deciding how to structure U.S. copyright law.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit held that URAA § 514 is a valid exercise of Congress’s Copyright and Patent Clause authority because the Constitution does not categorically forbid restoring copyright in foreign works that had previously fallen into the U.S. public domain, and Congress could rationally enact restoration in connection with international copyright commitments and related policy objectives.


Luck's Music Library v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (2005)