## Facts

- Erich Lüth, a Hamburg public official and press-club president, publicly criticized filmmaker Veit Harlan (director of the Nazi-era film *Jud Süß*) and urged distributors and cinema owners to boycott Harlan’s new film *Unsterbliche Geliebte*.
- After a production company challenged his accusations, Lüth published an open letter reiterating the boycott call and describing Harlan as a committed supporter of Nazi persecution of Jews.
- Film companies sued in Hamburg civil court, alleging Lüth’s boycott appeal intentionally caused immoral harm under German Civil Code § 826.
- The Hamburg Regional Court issued and later confirmed an injunction barring Lüth from urging cinema owners, distributors, or the public to boycott the film; appellate review in the ordinary courts failed.
- Lüth filed a constitutional complaint asserting the civil judgment violated his constitutional right to freedom of expression under Article 5(1) of the Basic Law.

## Issues

1. Whether civil-court judgments applying private-law provisions can constitute state action reviewable for violations of constitutional rights.
2. Whether constitutional rights affect private-law disputes indirectly by binding courts’ interpretation and application of private law.
3. Whether a general private-law clause such as Civil Code § 826 may limit expression as a “general law,” and, if so, how it must be construed in light of freedom of expression.
4. Whether a morally and politically motivated public call for a boycott is protected expression or is necessarily “contrary to good morals” under § 826.

## Decision

- The Federal Constitutional Court held that civil-court decisions are reviewable on constitutional complaint insofar as they may violate constitutional rights by failing to account for their effect on private law.
- The Court held constitutional rights are not only defensive rights against the state but also an objective constitutional value order that permeates the legal system.
- The Court treated Civil Code § 826 as a “general law” capable of limiting expression, but required it to be interpreted and applied in a manner giving due weight to freedom of expression.
- The Court held a boycott call is not inherently immoral under § 826; depending on the circumstances, freedom of expression may justify such advocacy.
- The Court vacated the Hamburg Regional Court’s injunction and remanded for reconsideration under the correct constitutional standards.

## Legal Principles

- Judicial decisions in private-law disputes may violate constitutional rights when courts apply private law without giving effect to constitutional rights; constitutional review is limited to such rights infringements, not general legal error.
- Constitutional rights constitute an objective value order that binds all branches of government and influences the entire legal system, including private law.
- In disputes between private parties, constitutional rights operate indirectly by requiring courts to interpret and apply open-textured private-law standards consistently with constitutional rights.
- “General laws” that are not aimed at suppressing expression may restrict expression, but must be construed in light of the special importance of free expression in a democratic order.
- Freedom of expression protects not only the utterance of opinions but also their intended influence on others, including advocacy that calls for collective action such as a boycott.

## Conclusion

The court set aside the civil injunction against Lüth’s boycott appeal, establishing that constitutional free-expression values must guide civil courts’ use of general private-law clauses and that boycott advocacy may be protected speech depending on context.


Lueth (Lüth) Case, 7 BVerfGE 198 (BVerfG 1958)