## Facts

- The Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies, through consultation, to ensure their actions do not jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat.
- Federal wildlife agencies initially construed § 7(a)(2) to apply to federal actions in foreign nations, but a 1986 rule limited the consultation duty to actions within the United States and the high seas.
- Environmental organizations challenged the 1986 rule, contending the ESA required consultation for U.S.-funded projects abroad that could affect endangered species.
- Two members submitted affidavits stating they had previously visited affected areas abroad (Egypt and Sri Lanka) and intended to return at some unspecified future time to observe species.
- The district court dismissed for lack of standing; the Eighth Circuit reversed, and later affirmed merits relief requiring a new rule.
- The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether respondents had Article III standing.

## Issues

1. Whether respondents showed an injury in fact that was concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, based on aesthetic or recreational interests in observing endangered species abroad.
2. Whether the alleged harm was fairly traceable to the challenged regulation limiting § 7(a)(2) consultation.
3. Whether invalidating the regulation and requiring consultation was likely to redress the alleged injury.
4. Whether a statutory procedural right and the ESA citizen-suit provision can supply standing without a concrete, personal injury.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed, holding respondents lacked Article III standing.
- The affidavits alleging an intent to return “some day” did not establish an actual or imminent injury in fact.
- The Court rejected broad theories that would permit standing based on generalized ecosystem, professional, or organizational interests untethered to a concrete injury to specific members.
- The Court held that alleging a procedural violation or invoking a citizen-suit provision does not dispense with the need for a concrete, particularized injury.
- The Court noted additional doubts about causation and redressability, given uncertainty that consultation would change third-party conduct abroad, but resolved the case on failure to show injury in fact.

## Legal Principles

- Article III standing requires: (1) injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) traceability; and (3) redressability.
- On summary judgment, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must support standing elements with specific facts in competent evidence.
- “Some day” intentions to visit an affected area, without concrete plans or timing, are too speculative to establish imminence.
- Generalized grievances about governmental compliance with law are not justiciable, even when framed as a statutory right shared broadly by the public.
- A procedural right may relax some demands of causation and redressability only when the plaintiff still has a threatened concrete interest affected by the alleged procedural violation.

## Conclusion

The Court held that environmental organizations and their members lacked standing to challenge an agency rule narrowing the geographic scope of ESA consultation because they failed to show a concrete, imminent injury to themselves, and a statutory procedural claim could not substitute for the constitutionally required injury in fact.


Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)