## Facts

- The mayor appointed Reverend Eugene Lumpkin, Jr., a Baptist minister, to the San Francisco Human Rights Commission.
- A newspaper quoted Lumpkin stating that homosexuality was “an abomination against God” and that he had to preach it was a sin, triggering public controversy about his continued service on the Commission.
- The mayor initially announced he would not remove Lumpkin, citing Lumpkin’s record supporting gay and lesbian civil rights as a commissioner.
- The Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution calling for Lumpkin’s resignation or removal to restore public confidence in the Commission’s role, including its handling of lesbian and gay issues.
- After Lumpkin refused to resign, the mayor removed him from the Commission.
- Lumpkin sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also asserted claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).
- The federal court granted summary judgment for defendants on the § 1983 claims, finding the removal was based on legitimate secular concerns related to Commission effectiveness and avoiding controversy, not as a sanction for religious beliefs.
- The federal court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the FEHA claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
- Lumpkin refiled the FEHA claims in state court; the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on collateral estoppel grounds and entered a dismissal judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether issue preclusion applied because the federal summary judgment necessarily decided the same dispositive issue presented by the FEHA religious-discrimination claim.
2. Whether the federal judgment was sufficiently final for collateral estoppel purposes despite a pending appeal.
3. Whether, even if the elements of collateral estoppel were met, the trial court abused its discretion by applying issue preclusion on fairness and policy grounds.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
- The court held collateral estoppel barred the FEHA action because the federal case actually litigated and necessarily decided that the removal was motivated by legitimate secular concerns rather than religious discrimination.
- The court held the federal summary judgment was final enough for issue-preclusion purposes even though an appeal was pending.
- The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying collateral estoppel given Lumpkin’s full opportunity to litigate and the interests served by preventing relitigation.

## Legal Principles

- Collateral estoppel applies when: (1) the issue is identical to one decided previously; (2) it was actually litigated; (3) it was necessarily decided; (4) the prior decision is final and on the merits for preclusion purposes; and (5) the same party (or one in privity) is bound.
- Issue identity turns on the substance of what was decided, not whether the later claim relies on a different legal theory; different causes of action do not defeat preclusion if the same dispositive issue controls both cases.
- A prior judgment may be treated as final for issue preclusion even if an appeal is pending.
- California courts consider fairness and policy when applying issue preclusion, including judicial economy, consistency, and protection against repetitive litigation.

## Conclusion

Because the federal judgment necessarily determined that the mayor removed Lumpkin for legitimate secular reasons rather than because of his religion, Lumpkin was precluded from relitigating that motivation element under FEHA, and dismissal on demurrer was properly affirmed.


Lumpkin v. Jordan, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)