Lynch v. Hamrick, 968 So. 2d 11 (Ala. 2007)

Facts

  • Juanita Lynch owned a 40-acre tract of land and, on August 30, 2004, executed a deed conveying it to her daughter, Rebecca Lynch Hamrick.
  • Hamrick took Juanita to attorney Julie Wills (who advertised elder-law services) for a will change and the land conveyance; Hamrick provided Wills a “Chronology of Events” indicating other property had been conveyed to Juanita’s son, Buddy Lynch.
  • Wills was cautious because a potential beneficiary brought the elderly client; Wills believed Juanita was competent and that the plan (including the deed) reflected an even division between the children.
  • Wills later called Juanita at home to confirm Juanita’s wishes outside Hamrick’s presence and to check for influence.
  • At a second appointment, Wills met with Juanita alone; Juanita confirmed she wanted to deed the property to Hamrick because Buddy had received other property.
  • Juanita executed the deed at the second meeting; Wills notarized it, and Hamrick’s husband recorded it the next day.
  • After Buddy learned of the transfer, he sued as Juanita’s attorney-in-fact to set aside the deed, alleging Hamrick induced the conveyance with promises to care for Juanita; Juanita intervened seeking the same relief.
  • Hamrick sought Wills’s deposition; the Lynches moved to quash based on attorney-client privilege. The trial court allowed Wills to testify about the deed’s preparation and execution and later refused to set aside the deed.

Issues

  1. Whether the trial court erred by permitting the drafting attorney to testify about communications and circumstances surrounding execution of the deed, over an attorney-client privilege objection.
  2. Whether the evidence required setting aside the deed on the theory that a promise of future support was part of the deed’s consideration under Alabama law.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment.
  • The court held the trial court did not exceed its discretion in ruling that attorney-client privilege did not bar Wills’s testimony.
  • The court left intact the trial court’s finding that the Lynches failed to prove a promise of support formed part of the consideration for the conveyance.
  • Because the challenged testimony was properly admitted and the factual findings were supported by the record, the deed was not set aside.
  • A trial court’s determination whether a privilege applies is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • The party asserting attorney-client privilege bears the burden to show the communications were confidential and made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
  • Communications made in the presence of a third party who is not necessary to the attorney-client relationship generally are not confidential for privilege purposes.
  • An appellate court will not disturb trial-court fact findings on the consideration for a deed, including alleged support-based consideration, where supported by the record.

Conclusion

The court upheld the deed because the privilege objection failed for lack of a sufficient showing of confidentiality, and the challengers did not prove that a bargained-for promise of future care was part of the consideration for the conveyance.