## Facts

- Joe A. Lynch, a U.S. Marine Corps veteran (active duty July 1972–July 1976), sought VA disability compensation for service-connected PTSD.
- A private psychologist diagnosed PTSD and described significant symptoms; a VA examiner also diagnosed PTSD but assessed lesser functional impairment.
- The VA granted service connection and assigned a 30% disability rating.
- Lynch disputed the rating and submitted additional private psychiatric evidence indicating more severe impairment; a subsequent VA examiner found aspects of that private assessment unsupported by the available evidence.
- The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied a rating above 30%, discounting the private psychiatrist’s more severe conclusions as inconsistent with other evidence and Lynch’s reports.
- The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed, concluding the benefit-of-the-doubt rule did not apply because the evidence weighed against Lynch.
- Lynch appealed, arguing prior precedent misconstrued 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) by effectively requiring strict equipoise rather than an “approximate balance” of evidence.

## Issues

1. Whether 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)’s “approximate balance” standard requires strict equipoise, and whether prior precedent should be read to impose that requirement.
2. Whether the Board and the Veterans Court misapplied § 5107(b) in denying a PTSD rating higher than 30%.

## Decision

- The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment denying a rating above 30%.
- The court held that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule applies when evidence is “nearly equal” such that the factfinder cannot say the evidence persuasively favors one side.
- The court clarified that prior precedent does not require strict equality of evidence; any reading imposing strict equipoise is incorrect.
- On the record, the court concluded the evidence did not reach approximate balance because the Board reasonably found it weighed against a higher rating; therefore § 5107(b) did not apply.

## Legal Principles

- Under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), the Secretary must give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant when the positive and negative evidence on a material issue is in “approximate balance,” meaning “nearly equal.”
- “Preponderance of the evidence” means the evidence persuasively favors one side; when the evidence preponderates against the claimant, § 5107(b) is inapplicable.
- References to “equipoise” in veterans-benefits precedent should be understood as describing “approximate balance,” not a stricter requirement of exact equality.
- Where the Board finds (with record support) that evidence against a higher rating is more persuasive than evidence in favor, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not compel a different outcome.

## Conclusion

The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that § 5107(b) is triggered by a “nearly equal” evidentiary record, not strict equipoise, and held that because the Board reasonably found the evidence persuasively weighed against a higher PTSD rating, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule did not apply and the denial of an increase above 30% was affirmed.


Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021)