## Facts

- Bexar County Sheriff’s Deputy Robert O’Donnell tried to stop a Ford Taurus he believed was being driven by a suspect reported to be driving a stolen vehicle and allegedly linked to threats of violence.
- Heather Lytle, a fifteen-year-old, was a passenger in the Taurus (seated in the back seat).
- When O’Donnell activated his emergency lights, the driver did not pull over, and a high-speed chase followed.
- During the chase, the Taurus collided with an oncoming vehicle and came to a temporary stop.
- O’Donnell stopped his cruiser roughly twelve to fifteen feet behind the Taurus and got out.
- The Taurus then began moving in reverse toward O’Donnell’s cruiser; the parties disputed key details about the Taurus’s movement, position, and the level of danger at the time O’Donnell used force.
- As the Taurus pulled forward to flee, O’Donnell fired two shots at the rear of the Taurus.
- One shot struck and killed Heather Lytle.
- Ernest Lytle, individually and as representative of Heather’s estate, sued Bexar County, the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office, and O’Donnell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment (and related claims).
- O’Donnell moved to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds (treated as a summary-judgment motion), the district court denied relief, and O’Donnell filed an interlocutory appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fifth Circuit had interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity when the district court’s ruling turned on genuine disputes of material fact.
2. Taking the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, whether shooting into the rear of a fleeing vehicle could amount to an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and violate clearly established law.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
- The court held it could not revisit the district court’s determination that genuine issues of material fact existed about what occurred at the moment O’Donnell fired, including whether the Taurus still posed an immediate threat.
- On the plaintiff-favorable version of the disputed facts, the record could support a finding that O’Donnell used deadly force after any immediate danger had passed; that legal framing meant qualified immunity could not be resolved as a purely legal question on interlocutory review.

## Legal Principles

- An interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity is reviewable only to the extent it raises a legal question; the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to second-guess the district court’s finding that the summary-judgment record contains genuine disputes of material fact.
- Excessive-force claims arising during a seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard (Graham v. Connor).
- Deadly force is constitutionally permissible only when an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others (Tennessee v. Garner).
- When the legality of deadly force depends on contested “who-posed-what-threat-when” facts, qualified immunity often cannot be granted at summary judgment, and those disputes must be resolved by a factfinder.
- If a jury finds that the vehicle was moving away and no longer presented an immediate threat when shots were fired, then using deadly force in that moment can violate clearly established Fourth Amendment limits.

## Conclusion

In Lytle v. Bexar County, Texas, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Deputy O’Donnell’s interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity because the appeal depended on disputed, material facts about the Taurus’s movements and the immediacy of any danger when he fired, leaving the qualified-immunity issue for further proceedings in the district court.


Lytle v. Bexar County, Texas, 560 F.3d 404 (2009)