Machado v. Yacht Haven U.S.V.I., LLC, 61 V.I. 373 (V.I. 2014)

Facts

  • Elissa Machado finished work at a store in the Yacht Haven Grande complex on St. Thomas and walked to her car in the complex’s parking lot at about 6:25 p.m. on November 7, 2008.
  • A three-foot-wide landscaped median separated parking rows; it was bordered by eight-inch curbs and contained trees, shrubbery, and a sprinkler system, with no marked pedestrian walkway across it.
  • Machado parked on the far side of the median and crossed it using her “usual route,” as other patrons and employees had done; there were no warning signs and the property owner did not discourage the practice.
  • Machado tripped over a sprinkler head in the median, fell over the curb, and fractured both bones in her lower right leg.
  • Machado testified the area was “very, very dim” and that the lighting was poor; a coworker and paramedics used phone lights/flashlights to locate and assist her.
  • Machado sued Yacht Haven U.S.V.I., LLC, asserting premises-liability negligence based on inadequate lighting and the placement or maintenance of the sprinkler head.
  • The Superior Court granted Yacht Haven summary judgment after applying entrant-status categories (invitee/licensee/trespasser) and finding no duty.
  • Machado appealed; the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo.

Issues

  1. Whether Virgin Islands premises-liability law should continue to determine duty using invitee/licensee/trespasser classifications or apply a unitary reasonable-care standard grounded in foreseeability.
  2. Whether, under the proper duty standard, genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on Machado’s negligence claim.
  3. Whether assumption of risk remains a separate complete defense in Virgin Islands tort law or is generally addressed through comparative negligence.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded.
  • The court abolished the invitee/licensee/trespasser trichotomy for premises-liability cases and adopted a general duty of reasonable care based on foreseeability of harm.
  • The court held that assumption of risk is not a separate complete defense except where there is an express waiver or clear voluntary consent to a known risk; otherwise, the plaintiff’s conduct is considered under comparative negligence.
  • The court concluded the record permitted a jury to find foreseeable risk and potential breach (including evidence of common pedestrian use of the median, lack of warnings, and dim lighting), creating genuine disputes of material fact.
  • In Virgin Islands premises-liability actions, a land possessor’s duty is governed by a unitary reasonable-care standard, with foreseeability as the central consideration.
  • Foreseeability may be shown by the possessor’s knowledge of how people commonly use the property and the risk posed by existing conditions.
  • Except for express waivers or voluntary consent to a known risk, assumption of risk does not operate as a complete bar; conduct formerly framed as assumption of risk is evaluated as comparative negligence under 5 V.I.C. § 1451(a), with fault allocation generally for the jury.
  • Summary judgment is improper where evidence permits reasonable disagreement on duty, breach, or comparative fault in a negligence claim.

Conclusion

The court replaced entrant-status-based premises liability with a foreseeability-driven reasonable-care duty and limited assumption of risk to rare waiver/consent situations, requiring jury consideration of disputed facts about the hazard, lighting, foreseeability, and comparative fault.