## Facts

- Dorothy and Charles MacPherson married in 1947 and last lived together in Connecticut.
- Charles separated from Dorothy in December 1966 and moved to New York.
- The parties executed a separation agreement in October 1967, signed by Charles in New York and by Dorothy in Connecticut.
- The agreement required Charles to pay Dorothy $600 per month for support and stated the payments would cease upon Dorothy’s death or remarriage, or Charles’s death.
- Dorothy later went through a marriage ceremony with another man; the marriage was later annulled by an Illinois court as void ab initio because the man was already married.
- After the annulment, Dorothy sued Charles for continued payments, arguing that a void ab initio marriage meant she had never “remarried” within the meaning of the agreement.

## Issues

1. Under Tennessee conflict-of-laws rules applicable in diversity, which state’s substantive law governs interpretation of the separation agreement’s “remarriage” provision?
2. Under the governing law, does “remarriage” in a support-termination clause mean only a valid marriage, or does it include a marriage later annulled as void ab initio?

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment for Dorothy.
- Applying Tennessee contract choice-of-law principles, the court held Connecticut had the most significant relationship to the agreement and the parties; Connecticut law governed interpretation.
- Under Connecticut law, “remarriage” in the agreement was not limited to a technically valid marriage.
- Dorothy’s remarriage ceremony and ensuing marital relationship triggered the termination clause despite the later annulment, ending Charles’s support obligation as of the remarriage.

## Legal Principles

- In diversity cases, a federal court applies the forum state’s conflict-of-laws rules to select the governing substantive law for contract interpretation.
- Under Tennessee contract conflicts principles, the governing law is that of the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.
- Under Connecticut contract principles for separation/support agreements, disputed terms are interpreted in light of their practical, economic purpose and the parties’ intended allocation of support responsibilities.
- A contractual termination provision tied to “remarriage” may be construed to refer to the occurrence of a new marital relationship as an economic event, rather than to the continuing technical validity of the marriage under domestic-relations doctrines.
- A later annulment declaring a marriage void ab initio does not necessarily negate the effect of a “remarriage” termination clause when doing so would defeat the agreement’s expected endpoint and introduce uncertainty into support obligations.

## Conclusion

The court held that Connecticut law governed the separation agreement and that the wife’s “remarriage,” though later annulled as void ab initio, ended the husband’s contractual duty to pay support because the clause was aimed at the practical shift of support to a new spouse, not the technical validity of the later marriage.


MacPherson v. MacPherson, 496 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1974)