## Facts

- A testator executed a will giving his entire estate to his wife for life, with the remainder to his four sons per stirpes and equally divided after the life estate ended.
- A codicil altered the remainder distribution by giving three sons their one-fourth shares immediately, while directing executors to hold two-thirds of the fourth son’s one-fourth share “in trust” for the testator’s granddaughter until she reached age 27, at which time the interest would vest in the granddaughter’s father (the fourth son).
- In another clause, the testator expressed a “wish” that his surviving sons form a “board of arbitration” to distribute the estate and a “desire” that the granddaughter be “provided for” as determined by the executors and the board.
- The granddaughter’s father died before the testator.
- By the time the estate was administered, the widow had also died, ending the life estate.
- The surviving sons did not form the contemplated “board of arbitration” and made no separate provision for the granddaughter.
- The granddaughter filed an equity action for declaratory relief, claiming the instruments created a trust or vested interest entitling her to a fractional share of the estate (asserted up to one-fifth).
- The chancellor granted a motion to dismiss; the granddaughter appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the will and codicil created an enforceable trust or vested beneficial interest in favor of the granddaughter.
2. Whether the will’s “wish” and “desire” language regarding provision for the granddaughter and a “board of arbitration” imposed a mandatory duty or was merely precatory.
3. Whether the granddaughter’s asserted interest survived her father’s death before the testator so as to support her claim to a share of the estate.

## Decision

- The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the order dismissing the complaint.
- The court held the instruments did not create an enforceable trust or vested estate interest for the granddaughter based on the “wish” and “desire” language.
- The court treated the third-paragraph language as precatory and insufficient to impose a binding obligation on the sons or executors.
- The court rejected a construction that would reallocate the remainder interests or create a new fractional share for the granddaughter where the will and codicil otherwise disposed of the entire remainder.
- Because the pleaded facts, read with the testamentary instruments, did not establish a legally cognizable entitlement to the relief sought, dismissal on the pleadings was proper.

## Legal Principles

- Precatory terms in testamentary instruments (e.g., “wish,” “desire,” “request”) generally do not create a trust or enforceable duty absent clear intent to impose a legal obligation.
- A trust will not be implied from general expressions of hoped-for conduct where the property to be charged and the obligation to be enforced are not stated with sufficient certainty.
- When a will and codicil dispose of the entire remainder interest, courts will not infer additional equitable interests that effectively redistribute the estate contrary to the expressed dispositive plan.
- Courts construe will and codicil together to effectuate the testator’s intent as expressed, and will not rewrite the plan based on perceived moral obligations or later events (such as the predecease of an intended taker).

## Conclusion

The court held that the testator’s general expression that his granddaughter be “provided for” left the matter to others’ discretion and did not create a binding trust or vested interest; therefore, her declaratory action seeking an additional share of the estate failed as a matter of law and was properly dismissed.


Magnant v. Peacock, 25 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1946)