## Facts

- In 1941, W. E. and Jennie Hutton conveyed 1.5 acres to school trustees by deed stating the land was “to be used for school purpose only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein.”
- A school operated on the property until May 30, 1973; afterward, the district stopped holding classes there and used the property for storage.
- W. E. Hutton (d. 1951) and Jennie Hutton (d. 1969) died intestate; their sole heir was their son, Harry E. Hutton.
- In 1959, Earl and Madeline Jacqmain conveyed surrounding acreage to Herbert and Betty Mahrenholz, excepting the school grounds but purporting to convey a “reversionary interest” in them.
- In 1977, Harry Hutton executed (1) a deed to the Mahrenholzes conveying all his interest in the school land and later (2) a disclaimer and release in favor of the county school trustees purporting to relinquish any possibility of reverter or right of entry.

## Issues

1. Whether the 1941 deed created a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter, or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent with a right of entry.
2. Depending on the characterization, whether the asserted “reversionary” interests were capable of being transferred by deed under applicable property-law rules.
3. Whether dismissal on the pleadings was proper given the deed’s construction and the alleged cessation of school use.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded.
- The court held the 1941 deed created a fee simple determinable in the school trustees, followed by a possibility of reverter in the grantors (and by descent in their heir).
- The trial court erred in construing the deed as creating a fee simple subject to condition subsequent with a right of entry.
- The appellate court did not finally determine ownership, leaving further proceedings to address the effect of post-1973 use and the parties’ competing claims.

## Legal Principles

- Deed language limiting use “only” for a stated purpose, coupled with language that the land will “revert” if the purpose is not met, is strong evidence of a fee simple determinable with automatic termination upon breach.
- A fee simple determinable ends automatically upon the occurrence of the limiting event; the future interest retained is a possibility of reverter.
- A fee simple subject to condition subsequent requires affirmative action to retake the property; the future interest retained is a right of entry.
- Under the common-law rule applied by the court, possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are inheritable but not transferable by inter vivos conveyance (and not devisable by will), affecting whether attempted transfers of such future interests are effective.

## Conclusion

The appellate court construed the “school purpose only; otherwise to revert” clause as creating a fee simple determinable and a possibility of reverter, reversed the pleading-stage dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings to determine the parties’ rights under that construction.


Mahrenholz v. Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1981)