## Facts

- In March 1941, W.E. and Jennie Hutton conveyed 1.5 acres out of their 40‑acre tract to the trustees of School District No. 1 by deed stating the land was “to be used for school purposes only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein.”   
- The district built and operated the Hutton School on the land and held classes there until 1973, when students were moved elsewhere and the property was used only for storage.   
- In July 1941, the Huttons purported to convey their “reversionary interest” in the school land to Earl and Madeline Jacqmain; in 1959, the Jacqmains purported to convey that future interest to Herbert and Betty Mahrenholz, while excepting the school parcel itself from their deed.   
- W.E. Hutton died intestate in 1951 and Jennie Hutton in 1969, leaving their son, Harry E. Hutton, as sole heir.   
- On May 7, 1977, Harry conveyed to the Mahrenholzes “all of his interest” in the Hutton School land; on September 6, 1977, he executed a separate written “Disclaimer and Release” in favor of the County Board of School Trustees, disclaiming any possibility of reverter or right of entry.   
- The Mahrenholzes filed an action to quiet title, claiming ownership of the school parcel through the Jacqmains’ purported transfer of the future interest and Harry’s 1977 deed.   
- The trial court held that the 1941 deed created a fee simple subject to condition subsequent with a right of reentry, not a fee simple determinable; it ruled that such a right of reentry was not transferable inter vivos, passed to Harry as heir, and had not been effectively exercised, so title remained with the school authorities. The complaint was dismissed, and the Mahrenholzes appealed.   

## Issues

1. Whether the 1941 deed language “to be used for school purposes only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein” created a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter, or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent with a right of reentry.   
2. Depending on that construction, whether the Mahrenholzes could acquire an interest in the property through the Jacqmains’ purported conveyance of the Huttons’ future interest and Harry Hutton’s 1977 deed, despite common‑law limits on transferability of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry.   

## Decision

- The appellate court held that the 1941 deed created a fee simple determinable in the school district, followed by a possibility of reverter in the Huttons and their heir.   
- The court emphasized the limiting word “only” tied to “school purposes,” together with “otherwise to revert to Grantors,” as indicating an automatically terminating estate rather than one requiring exercise of a right of entry.   
- Because Illinois followed the common‑law rule that possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are inheritable but not transferable by inter vivos conveyance, the 1941 and 1959 attempts by the Huttons and Jacqmains to transfer the future interest were ineffective; that interest passed by intestacy to Harry Hutton.   
- If the estate was determinable, the school district’s cessation of school use in 1973 may have automatically shifted title back to Harry, potentially enabling his 1977 deed to pass title (or an interest) to the Mahrenholzes; the trial court’s contrary construction of the deed was therefore erroneous.   
- The judgment dismissing the Mahrenholzes’ complaint was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine, among other matters, whether the conditions for reverter had in fact occurred.   

## Legal Principles

- Deed language using a strong durational modifier such as “only” tied to a stated use, coupled with an express clause that the land is “to revert” to the grantor upon cessation of that use, is interpreted as creating a fee simple determinable rather than a fee simple subject to condition subsequent.   
- A fee simple determinable ends automatically when the specified limitation is violated; ownership immediately shifts to the holder of the possibility of reverter, without need for reentry.  
- Under traditional common law (as applied in Illinois at the time), possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are inheritable but are not transferable by will or inter vivos conveyance; attempted transfers are void, and the interest instead passes to heirs upon the holder’s death.   
- In construing ambiguous deed language, courts examine the entire instrument and favor interpretations that give full effect to the words used, particularly express reversionary language, and that align with precedent on similar phrasing.   

## Conclusion

The appellate court construed the Huttons’ 1941 deed as creating a fee simple determinable in the school district, with a possibility of reverter in the grantors and their heir. Because such future interests were inheritable but not inter vivos transferable, earlier attempts to convey them were ineffective; title may have reverted automatically to Harry Hutton when the property ceased being used for school purposes in 1973. The trial court’s contrary characterization of the estate as a fee simple subject to condition subsequent was reversed, and the case was remanded to determine whether the determinable fee had in fact terminated and what interest, if any, the Mahrenholzes acquired.


Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 417 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)