## Facts

- The City of Altus, Oklahoma adopted a written English-only policy requiring employees to communicate only in English while conducting city business, with a limited exception for communicating with citizens with limited English proficiency.
- The City cited concerns about radio communications, coworker discomfort with Spanish conversations, and safety around heavy equipment.
- Plaintiffs were Hispanic, bilingual city employees who regularly spoke English and Spanish at work.
- Plaintiffs presented evidence that supervisors admonished Spanish use beyond the written rule, including during breaks and private conversations.
- Plaintiffs also presented evidence of ridicule and ethnic taunting after the policy, and that a city official privately warned an employee about teasing likely to follow.
- A news report quoted the mayor as calling Spanish “garbage” (the mayor disputed the wording), which plaintiffs cited as evidence of hostility.
- The City adopted the policy without consulting Hispanic employees and without informing a consultant hired to investigate alleged anti-Hispanic discrimination.
- After EEOC proceedings, plaintiffs sued asserting Title VII disparate impact and disparate treatment (including hostile work environment), Title VI, § 1981 intentional discrimination, and § 1983 equal protection and First Amendment claims.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims, and plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether summary judgment was improper on plaintiffs’ Title VII disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims, including hostile work environment, challenging the English-only policy.
2. Whether plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to proceed under § 1981 and the Equal Protection Clause via § 1983.
3. Whether the English-only policy violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights as public employees.
4. Whether dismissal of Title VI and other remaining claims (including certain retaliation theories) was proper.

## Decision

- Reversed and remanded summary judgment for the City on Title VII disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims, including hostile work environment.
- Reversed and remanded summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1981 intentional-discrimination claim.
- Reversed and remanded summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 equal-protection claim.
- Affirmed summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.
- Affirmed dismissal of Title VI and other remaining claims, including certain retaliation-related theories.

## Legal Principles

- English-only workplace rules may support Title VII disparate-impact liability where they disproportionately burden protected groups and are not justified by business necessity.
- Evidence that an English-only rule was adopted or enforced broadly (e.g., reaching breaks or private conversations) may support an inference that the rule exceeds operational needs and contributes to a hostile work environment.
- Discriminatory intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as derogatory remarks by decisionmakers, weak or thinly supported justifications, and workplace taunting tied to national origin or ethnicity.
- Where plaintiffs’ Title VII evidence permits an inference of intentional discrimination, the same record may also defeat summary judgment on § 1981 and § 1983 equal-protection claims based on overlapping intent standards.
- A public-employee First Amendment claim generally requires speech on a matter of public concern; workplace rules regulating how employees communicate in performing duties may be upheld where the regulated speech is treated as internal operational communication rather than public-concern expression.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the City’s English-only policy unlawful under Title VII and actionable as intentional discrimination under § 1981 and equal protection under § 1983, but it rejected the employees’ First Amendment challenge and left Title VI and other dismissed claims undisturbed.


Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006)