## Facts

- After severe domestic violence, Ana Maldonado obtained a Temporary Protective Order and then a Civil Protection Order (CPO) on January 30, 1992, effective until January 30, 1993; Julio Maldonado consented to the CPO.
- The abuse included repeated beatings (hands, belt, thick cable), threats with a gun, and other force causing loss of consciousness; a January 13, 1992 beating required hospital treatment, after which the wife and two daughters went into hiding.
- The CPO included no-abuse and no-contact provisions, stay-away requirements (home, person, workplace, children’s school), temporary custody to the wife with no visitation for the husband absent further order, child support, and property/document turnover.
- On December 21, 1992, the wife moved to extend the CPO for one year (to January 30, 1994); the husband consented, and a hearing was set.
- Before the extension hearing, the husband pleaded guilty in a related criminal matter and was sentenced on December 30, 1992, to at least two years’ imprisonment.
- At the January 26, 1993 extension hearing, the wife presented evidence that early release was realistically possible (e.g., furlough, parole eligibility, credit for presentence custody).
- The trial court denied the extension, reasoning a CPO was unnecessary while the husband was incarcerated.
- The wife appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying an extension of a civil protection order solely because the respondent was incarcerated, despite evidence of potential early release and continuing safety concerns.

## Decision

- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
- The court held the trial court abused its discretion by treating incarceration as dispositive and failing to consider the statutory protective purposes of a CPO and the evidence of possible early release.
- The case was remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard, with incarceration treated as relevant but not controlling.

## Legal Principles

- Civil protection orders under the Intrafamily Offenses Act are remedial measures intended to prevent future intrafamily offenses and protect victims, independent of criminal punishment.
- A respondent’s incarceration at the time of an extension request does not, by itself, make a CPO extension unnecessary; the court must evaluate the totality of circumstances.
- In deciding whether to extend a CPO, a court must consider factors such as the seriousness of past abuse, the likelihood of future contact or harm, the victim’s reasonable fear, and realistic possibilities of early release.
- Denying an extension based solely on incarceration constitutes an abuse of discretion because it reflects a failure to exercise legally proper discretion.

## Conclusion

The appellate court ruled that incarceration alone cannot justify refusing to extend a civil protection order; the trial court must assess whether continued protection is reasonably necessary in light of the history of violence, the victim’s fear, and the possibility that the respondent may be released before the order would otherwise expire.


Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1993)