## Facts

- Jessica Maldonado was hired in early 1997 as a part-time bank teller; part-time tellers performed the same tasks as full-time tellers and were expected to be available up to six days per week to cover absences.
- Maldonado’s supervisor, Amalia Gonzalez, stated during hiring that the bank most needed part-time coverage during the summer months when full-time tellers took vacations.
- Three days after her interview, Maldonado learned she was pregnant and due in July; she began teller training on February 20.
- On March 3, while still in training, Maldonado informed Gonzalez she was pregnant.
- Gonzalez terminated Maldonado the following day.
- For summary judgment purposes, the record was viewed to credit Maldonado’s testimony that Gonzalez said she was being terminated due to her “condition” (pregnancy).
- The bank did not dispute pregnancy was the reason for discharge; it contended the discharge was lawful because Maldonado would be unavailable during the peak summer period and therefore could not meet the position’s availability expectations.

## Issues

1. Whether evidence that an employee was fired because she was pregnant constitutes direct evidence of discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act sufficient to defeat summary judgment, even if the employer claims pregnancy would later interfere with availability.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Maldonado’s motion to strike the bank’s supplemental affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment.

## Decision

- The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the bank and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held Maldonado presented direct evidence that pregnancy motivated the termination, placing the claim within the PDA’s core prohibition.
- The court rejected the bank’s justification that anticipated pregnancy-related unavailability converted an explicit pregnancy-based discharge into a lawful, nondiscriminatory decision.
- The court affirmed the denial of Maldonado’s motion to strike the supplemental affidavit, finding no abuse of discretion.

## Legal Principles

- Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination because of pregnancy, and pregnant employees must be treated the same as others similar in their ability or inability to work.
- Direct evidence that pregnancy was a motivating factor supports a Title VII/PDA claim without requiring the plaintiff to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas comparator-based prima facie framework.
- An employer may not discharge an employee because it predicts pregnancy will interfere with future work or availability; framing the reason as an “availability requirement” does not cure an explicitly pregnancy-based decision.
- Evidentiary rulings on whether to strike summary-judgment affidavits are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that terminating a teller because she was pregnant—based on an employer’s expectation that pregnancy would later affect summer availability—constituted direct evidence of discrimination barred by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, requiring reversal of summary judgment, while leaving intact the district court’s refusal to strike a supplemental affidavit.


Maldonado v. U.S. Bank & Manufacturers Bank, 186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999)