## Facts

- John E. Mallard, an attorney newly admitted to practice before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, was selected under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to represent indigent inmates in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Mallard sought to withdraw, asserting the case’s complexity required trial skills he believed he lacked and arguing that compelled representation would conflict with professional obligations of competent representation.
- A magistrate judge denied withdrawal, and the district court affirmed, concluding that § 1915(d) authorized compulsory appointment of counsel in civil cases.
- Mallard petitioned the Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to permit withdrawal; the Eighth Circuit denied relief without opinion.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which provides that a court may “request” an attorney to represent an indigent person, authorizes a federal court to compel an unwilling attorney to serve in a civil case.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court ruled for Mallard, 5–4 (Justice Brennan).
- The Court held that § 1915(d) does not authorize federal courts to require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant.
- The Court reasoned that “request” does not imply compulsion and that Congress demonstrated elsewhere in § 1915 that it knew how to impose mandatory duties when intended.
- The Court rejected the argument that reading “request” as nonbinding makes the provision meaningless, concluding the statute legitimizes and formalizes judicial requests and places lawyers in an ethically weighty position.
- The Court limited its holding to statutory interpretation and did not decide whether federal courts possess inherent authority, apart from § 1915(d), to compel representation.
- The dissent would have construed “request,” in context, to permit courts to require service to secure representation for indigent litigants.

## Legal Principles

- Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (as then in force), federal courts may request, but may not compel, attorneys to represent indigent civil litigants.
- Statutory interpretation begins with ordinary meaning; “request” signals permission to ask rather than authority to mandate.
- Statutory context matters: when Congress uses mandatory language elsewhere and chooses nonmandatory language here, the contrast supports a noncompulsory reading.
- A judicial request under § 1915(d) may carry ethical and professional weight, but it does not create legal compulsion or authorize sanctions for refusal under the statute.

## Conclusion

The Court interpreted § 1915(d) to permit only nonbinding requests for pro bono representation in indigent civil cases, rejecting compulsory appointments under the statute while leaving open any separate inherent-power theory of compelled representation.


Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989)