## Facts

- Robert Mallory worked nearly 20 years for Norfolk Southern Railway Co. as a freight-car mechanic in Ohio and Virginia, alleging exposure to asbestos and other carcinogens during that work.
- Mallory was later diagnosed with colon cancer and attributed it to those workplace exposures.
- Mallory sued Norfolk Southern in Pennsylvania state court despite residing in Virginia and alleging injuries and relevant conduct occurring outside Pennsylvania.
- Norfolk Southern is incorporated and headquartered in Virginia but has substantial business operations in Pennsylvania.
- Norfolk Southern had registered to do business in Pennsylvania under statutes that condition registration on submission to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts.

## Issues

1. Whether the Due Process Clause permits a state to treat a foreign corporation’s registration to do business as consent to general personal jurisdiction for claims unrelated to the forum.
2. Whether modern general-jurisdiction doctrine limiting nonconsensual general jurisdiction to where a corporation is “at home” bars jurisdiction when a corporation has purportedly consented by registration.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and remanded.
- A majority held that Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration regime, as applied, does not violate the Due Process Clause.
- A plurality relied on *Pennsylvania Fire* to treat express statutory consent-by-registration as a constitutionally valid basis for general jurisdiction.
- Justice Alito concurred in the judgment on due process grounds but indicated the statute may implicate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
- Four Justices dissented, concluding the consent theory conflicts with *International Shoe* and modern limits on general jurisdiction.

## Legal Principles

- Personal jurisdiction protections are waivable; a defendant may consent to suit in a forum, and consent can supply an independent basis for personal jurisdiction apart from minimum contacts analysis.
- A state may, consistent with due process, condition a foreign corporation’s authorization to do business on the corporation’s consent to general personal jurisdiction, where the statute clearly provides that consequence and the corporation registers under it.
- The “at home” limitation on nonconsensual general jurisdiction does not control when jurisdiction is exercised based on a corporation’s express consent under state law.
- Due process validity does not resolve whether a consent-by-registration scheme may be invalid under other constitutional provisions, including the Dormant Commerce Clause.

## Conclusion

The Court held that due process allows Pennsylvania to require an out-of-state corporation, as a condition of registering to do business, to consent to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts, even for claims unrelated to Pennsylvania.


Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023)