Facts
- Robert Mallory worked nearly 20 years for Norfolk Southern Railway Co. as a freight-car mechanic in Ohio and Virginia, alleging exposure to asbestos and other carcinogens during that work.
- Mallory was later diagnosed with colon cancer and attributed it to those workplace exposures.
- Mallory sued Norfolk Southern in Pennsylvania state court despite residing in Virginia and alleging injuries and relevant conduct occurring outside Pennsylvania.
- Norfolk Southern is incorporated and headquartered in Virginia but has substantial business operations in Pennsylvania.
- Norfolk Southern had registered to do business in Pennsylvania under statutes that condition registration on submission to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts.
Issues
- Whether the Due Process Clause permits a state to treat a foreign corporation’s registration to do business as consent to general personal jurisdiction for claims unrelated to the forum.
- Whether modern general-jurisdiction doctrine limiting nonconsensual general jurisdiction to where a corporation is “at home” bars jurisdiction when a corporation has purportedly consented by registration.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and remanded.
- A majority held that Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration regime, as applied, does not violate the Due Process Clause.
- A plurality relied on Pennsylvania Fire to treat express statutory consent-by-registration as a constitutionally valid basis for general jurisdiction.
- Justice Alito concurred in the judgment on due process grounds but indicated the statute may implicate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
- Four Justices dissented, concluding the consent theory conflicts with International Shoe and modern limits on general jurisdiction.
Legal Principles
- Personal jurisdiction protections are waivable; a defendant may consent to suit in a forum, and consent can supply an independent basis for personal jurisdiction apart from minimum contacts analysis.
- A state may, consistent with due process, condition a foreign corporation’s authorization to do business on the corporation’s consent to general personal jurisdiction, where the statute clearly provides that consequence and the corporation registers under it.
- The “at home” limitation on nonconsensual general jurisdiction does not control when jurisdiction is exercised based on a corporation’s express consent under state law.
- Due process validity does not resolve whether a consent-by-registration scheme may be invalid under other constitutional provisions, including the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Conclusion
The Court held that due process allows Pennsylvania to require an out-of-state corporation, as a condition of registering to do business, to consent to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts, even for claims unrelated to Pennsylvania.