## Facts

- Marc J. Loiselle retained attorney George C. Malonis shortly after an automobile accident to pursue a personal-injury claim under a one-third contingent-fee agreement.
- Over approximately two and one-half years, Malonis investigated and litigated the claim, including gathering evidence and medical records, obtaining PIP benefits, negotiating with the defendant, sending a statutory demand letter, and filing suit after settlement offers were rejected.
- Loiselle discharged Malonis and retained Robert W. Harrington under a similar contingent-fee agreement.
- Malonis transferred the client file and gave written notice to Loiselle, Harrington, and the defendant that he intended to assert an attorney’s lien on any recovery.
- Harrington later settled the case for $57,500, distributing $40,000 to Loiselle and retaining $17,500 as his contingent fee; during settlement, Harrington assured opposing counsel he would “take care of” Malonis’s lien.
- Malonis sent an itemized bill for fees and expenses reflecting the reasonable value of his work; Harrington refused to pay.
- After a Superior Court trial, the judge found the parties expected Harrington would pay Malonis from Harrington’s contingent fee and entered judgment against Harrington for Malonis’s reasonable fees and expenses.

## Issues

1. Whether, on these facts, successor counsel may be held personally liable to discharged counsel for the reasonable value of discharged counsel’s services and expenses in a contingent-fee personal-injury matter.
2. Whether the court should adopt a general rule allocating responsibility for such payments between the client and successor counsel in all cases.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment holding Harrington liable to Malonis for Malonis’s reasonable fees and expenses.
- The court declined to adopt an across-the-board rule allocating payment responsibility between clients and successor counsel in all contingent-fee transitions.
- The court emphasized that allocation questions should be addressed case by case through full disclosure and agreement among the client, discharged counsel, and successor counsel.

## Legal Principles

- A client may discharge contingent-fee counsel, but discharged counsel remains entitled to the reasonable value of services (and related expenses) that contributed to a later recovery.
- A successor attorney who takes over a matter with actual notice of a predecessor’s fee claim and lien, represents that the lien will be handled to effectuate settlement, and retains the full contingent fee may, on the particular facts, be required to satisfy the predecessor’s reasonable fee and expenses.
- Courts may resolve fee-allocation disputes in a fact-specific manner rather than by categorical rules; disclosure obligations and professional-responsibility considerations inform the analysis.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed a fact-specific judgment requiring successor counsel to pay discharged counsel’s reasonable fees and expenses where successor counsel had notice of the lien, assured opposing counsel it would be handled, and retained the entire contingent fee, while declining to impose a general allocation rule for all similar disputes.


Malonis v. Harrington, 442 Mass. 692, 816 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 2004)