## Facts

- Isaac Manego sought local liquor and entertainment licenses to open a disco in Orleans, Massachusetts.
- A nearby ice-skating rink used heavily by children was owned by Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank; the rink’s manager (and the Bank’s vice president), David B. Willard, also served as president of the Orleans Board of Trade.
- Willard and the Bank opposed the disco, citing safety concerns and the disco’s proximity to children.
- The Orleans Board of Trade organized opposition to Manego’s project, including a petition with hundreds of signatures, and urged the Orleans Board of Selectmen to deny the licenses.
- The Board of Selectmen denied the license applications; Manego’s administrative and judicial challenges to that denial were unsuccessful.
- After earlier related litigation, Manego filed this federal action under Sherman Act § 1 against the Bank, Willard, the Board of Trade, and Board members, alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade by preventing his disco from opening.
- The district court granted summary judgment: (1) for the Bank and Willard on claim preclusion grounds based on an earlier federal civil-rights action arising from the same licensing dispute; and (2) for the Board of Trade and its members under Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity.

## Issues

1. Whether the Sherman Act § 1 claims against the Bank and Willard were barred by claim preclusion because they arose from the same transaction as Manego’s prior federal civil-rights litigation over the license denials.
2. Whether the Board of Trade’s opposition to Manego’s license applications was immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and whether the record showed a triable basis for an exception such as sham petitioning or fraud.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all defendants.
- The antitrust claims against the Bank and Willard were barred by claim preclusion because they arose from the same factual transaction as the earlier federal case and could have been brought there.
- Claim preclusion did not automatically bar the claims against the Board of Trade because it was not a party to the earlier federal action.
- The claims against the Board of Trade and its members nevertheless failed because their conduct constituted petitioning of local government protected by Noerr-Pennington, and Manego did not produce evidence sufficient to trigger an exception.

## Legal Principles

- Claim preclusion bars later litigation between the same parties (or privies) after a final judgment on the merits as to claims arising from the same transaction, including claims that could have been raised earlier.
- Under the transactional approach, different legal theories (e.g., civil-rights versus antitrust) and different alleged motives do not create separate claims when the suits target the same operative facts, means, and practical end.
- Noerr-Pennington generally immunizes efforts to influence governmental action from antitrust liability, including petitions and coordinated advocacy aimed at licensing decisions.
- To avoid Noerr-Pennington at summary judgment, a plaintiff must present specific evidence supporting a recognized exception (such as objectively baseless sham petitioning or fraud), not conclusory allegations.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit held that Manego’s antitrust suit was largely an attempt to relitigate the same licensing dispute under a new legal label: claims against the Bank and its officer were precluded because they arose from the same transaction as earlier federal litigation, and claims against the business association defendants failed because their opposition to the licenses was protected petitioning activity without record support for any exception.


Manego v. Orleans Bd. of Trade, 773 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985)