## Facts

- Eric Manley, Skylier Smith, and George Cook (plaintiffs), residents of Georgia and Texas, sued Navmar Applied Sciences Corp. (Navmar) and nine individual defendants (Navmar employees and one government employee) over their removal from a training program.
- Plaintiffs filed the action in Pennsylvania state court asserting federal and state claims arising from a six-week intensive training program at Navmar’s Yuma, Arizona operations.
- Plaintiffs alleged Navmar hired them to attend the Yuma program and that successful completion would lead to a 12-month deployment to Afghanistan with premium compensation and benefits.
- Plaintiffs claimed they were treated unfairly during the program and were wrongfully terminated from the program, allegedly because of race (and also alleging age discrimination).
- The complaint asserted federal discrimination claims (including 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, and the ADEA) and state-law claims (including breach of contract, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent training, and tortious interference with contractual relations).
- Navmar’s principal place of business was in Pennsylvania; at least one individual defendant (Fenerty) resided in Pennsylvania, while several other individual defendants resided in Arizona or other states.
- Navmar removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
- At the time of the opinion, only Navmar and Fenerty had been served.
- Navmar and Fenerty moved to transfer venue to the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (or, alternatively, sought a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)).
- Plaintiffs conceded the events giving rise to their claims occurred in Arizona, but opposed transfer on the ground that litigating in Arizona would be too costly for them.
- In seeking transfer, Navmar and Fenerty relied generally on the Arizona location of events and witnesses, but did not identify any witness who could not appear in Pennsylvania or explain any concrete hardship from litigating in Pennsylvania.

## Issues

1. Whether the action should be transferred to the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) based on convenience and the interests of justice where the operative events occurred in Arizona, but the employer was based in Pennsylvania and the movants did not show witness unavailability or specific hardship.
2. Whether the complaint plausibly stated federal and state claims under Rule 12(b)(6) where it relied on conclusory assertions and largely treated multiple defendants as a single undifferentiated group.
3. Whether a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) was appropriate instead of dismissal when the pleading lacked sufficient factual allegations.

## Decision

- The motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was denied.
- The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) was granted, and the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim.
- The request for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) was denied as unnecessary in light of dismissal.

## Legal Principles

- A party seeking transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) bears the burden to show that convenience and the interests of justice favor transfer, based on specific facts rather than generalized statements.
- A plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to deference, even when the operative events occurred elsewhere, though that choice may receive less weight when the forum has limited connection to the underlying events.
- Under Twombly/Iqbal, a complaint must include enough factual matter to state a plausible claim; legal conclusions, labels, and formulaic recitations of elements do not suffice.
- When multiple defendants are named, the complaint must allege facts showing each defendant’s conduct that could give rise to liability; grouping defendants together without defendant-specific facts may fail Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6).
- Rule 12(e) is aimed at pleadings so vague or ambiguous that a responsive pleading cannot reasonably be framed; it is not a substitute for dismissal where the problem is a lack of factual content.

## Conclusion

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined to transfer the case to Arizona because Navmar and the only served individual defendant did not show concrete witness or evidence burdens that made Arizona clearly more convenient, despite Arizona being the site of the alleged events. The court nevertheless dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiffs’ discrimination and related state-law theories were pleaded in conclusory terms and did not set out sufficient facts—particularly as to what each defendant allegedly did—to allow a reasonable inference of liability.


Manley v. Navmar Applied Sciences Corp., 2012 WL 5588757 (2012)