## Facts

- The RMS Titanic sank in 1912 and was discovered in 1985 in the North Atlantic at roughly 12,000 feet.
- In 1987, Titanic Ventures Limited Partnership and IFREMER conducted a major salvage expedition at the wreck, recovering about 1,800 artifacts.
- In August 1992, Marex Titanic, Inc. filed an admiralty in rem action seeking either exclusive ownership of recovered objects or a salvage award.
- To support in rem jurisdiction, Marex deposited with the court two purported Titanic artifacts (a piece of metal and a prescription bottle).
- The district court issued a warrant of arrest for the wreck and ordered Marex to publish notice within 10 days under the Supplemental Admiralty Rules; Marex published 32 days late, after its vessel had already departed for the site.
- Titanic Ventures made a special appearance to move to vacate the warrant of arrest, asserting factual misrepresentations by Marex and urging deference to France’s prior exercise of authority over the wreck.
- Titanic Ventures sought a preliminary injunction to bar Marex from salvaging; the district court held evidentiary hearings and issued a temporary restraining order.
- After three days of injunction hearings, Marex filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(i), at a time when Titanic Ventures had filed neither an answer nor a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court nonetheless vacated the notice of dismissal, permitted Titanic Ventures to intervene, vacated Marex’s warrant of arrest, declared Titanic Ventures the exclusive salvor in possession, and permanently enjoined Marex from salvage operations.

## Issues

1. Whether a plaintiff’s Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice filed before service of any answer or motion for summary judgment automatically terminates the action without court order.
2. Whether a district court may refuse or vacate such a notice based on substantial proceedings (including evidentiary hearings on injunctive relief) or equitable concerns.
3. Whether orders entered after an effective Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal—such as intervention, arrest vacatur, exclusive-salvor designation, and injunctions—are valid.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit reversed.
- Marex’s Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice was self-executing and immediately terminated the action because no adverse party had served an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court lacked authority to vacate the dismissal or to take further action on the merits, including allowing intervention and issuing salvage-related injunctive and declaratory relief.
- The court declined to recognize a “substantial proceedings” exception and rejected reliance on cases suggesting such an exception.
- Allegations that Marex misled the court did not supply a basis to undo a self-executing dismissal through Rule 60(b), because there was no judicial order or judgment to vacate once the notice was filed.

## Legal Principles

- Under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) (now Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)), a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss an action without court order by filing a notice before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
- Courts may not condition, deny, or rescind a timely Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal based on how far the case has progressed short of the rule’s specified trigger events.
- Once a proper Rule 41(a)(1) notice is filed, the case is terminated and the district court is divested of authority to enter further merits orders in that action.
- Post-dismissal orders affecting parties’ rights in the dismissed action—including intervention and injunctive relief—are void.

## Conclusion

Because Marex filed its Rule 41(a)(1) notice before any answer or summary-judgment motion, the dismissal took effect immediately and stripped the district court of power to proceed; the later intervention ruling, exclusive-salvor designation, and injunction against Marex could not stand.


Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1993)