## Facts

- War N. Marion, a Wisconsin inmate at Columbia Correctional Institution, was involved in a cell incident after his cellmate argued with him and charged at him; Marion responded by clenching his fists.
- A prison psychologist reported the situation, officers separated the inmates, and Marion was placed in segregation.
- Marion alleged procedural defects in the disciplinary process, including a false conduct report, denial of two staff witnesses, ineffective assistance from a prison advocate, and a hearing held in his absence based on a false claim that he refused to attend.
- A hearing officer found Marion guilty of “threats” and “disruptive conduct” and imposed 240 days of disciplinary segregation, moving him from a less restrictive segregation status (D.S.2) to a more restrictive one (D.S.1).
- Marion alleged that, due to this and a related proceeding, he served about 420 days in D.S.1.
- After exhausting administrative remedies, Marion filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserting (1) due process violations tied to the discipline and (2) equal protection violations based on unequal treatment.
- The district court dismissed at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim, concluding the segregation did not implicate a protected liberty interest and the equal protection allegations were insufficient.

## Issues

1. Whether 240 days of disciplinary segregation (and related time in a more restrictive segregation status) can constitute an atypical and significant hardship creating a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
2. Whether dismissal at the screening stage was improper because the liberty-interest inquiry required factual development about the conditions and severity of segregation.
3. Whether the complaint stated a plausible equal protection claim based on differential treatment of similarly situated inmates with discriminatory intent.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the due process claim and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that 240 days of segregation is long enough to implicate a liberty interest if the conditions of confinement were sufficiently severe, requiring development of a factual record on conditions.
- The court affirmed dismissal of the equal protection claim for inadequate pleading.

## Legal Principles

- A prisoner has a protected liberty interest when discipline imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” compared with ordinary prison life.
- Whether segregation triggers a liberty interest depends on both duration and conditions; there is no fixed day-count threshold.
- At the pleading stage, courts must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and should not foreclose a due process claim alleging lengthy, restrictive segregation without allowing factual development on actual confinement conditions.
- If a liberty interest is established, the constitutionality of disciplinary procedures turns on whether minimal procedural protections were provided (including notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, with witness access subject to institutional limits).

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that Marion’s allegations of many months in restrictive segregation were sufficient to potentially establish a due process-protected liberty interest, making dismissal at screening improper without a developed record of confinement conditions; it reinstated the due process claim for further proceedings while leaving the equal protection claim dismissed.


Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009)