## Facts

- Former students in a regional school district alleged they were sexually abused by certain teachers/coaches.
- Plaintiffs alleged other school employees and the school district knew or should have known of the abuse but failed to protect them or report suspected abuse to the State as required by RSA 169-C:29.
- Plaintiffs brought federal and state claims in federal district court, including negligence, assault and battery, state constitutional claims, and claims premised on the child-abuse reporting statute.
- The federal district court certified questions of New Hampshire law to the state supreme court regarding statutory remedies, negligence per se, common-law duties of school employees, the duration of any duty, and whether a damages remedy exists directly under the state constitution.

## Issues

1. Whether RSA 169-C:29 (child-abuse reporting) creates an express or implied private right of action for failure to report.
2. Whether violation of RSA 169-C:29 constitutes negligence per se in an action framed as inadequate supervision/failure to protect students.
3. Whether school employees owe a common-law duty, based on a special relationship, to take reasonable steps to protect students from sexual abuse by other school employees, and which employees may owe that duty.
4. Whether any special-relationship-based duty continues after a student graduates or otherwise leaves the school’s custody.
5. Whether failures to protect or report can support a direct damages remedy under N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 2.

## Decision

- RSA 169-C:29 does not create a private right of action; the statute is penal and does not show legislative intent to impose civil liability for nonreporting.
- Violation of RSA 169-C:29 is not negligence per se for an inadequate-supervision claim because the statute’s reporting duty differs from the common-law duty alleged (reasonable supervision/protection).
- School employees who act as supervisory “parental proxies” for students may owe a duty of reasonable supervision; employees with supervisory responsibility who have actual knowledge of abuse, or facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude abuse is occurring, may be liable if their unreasonable supervision is a proximate cause of injury.
- The special-relationship-based duty is generally limited to the period the student is entrusted to the school’s custody and supervision; it does not ordinarily extend beyond graduation or the end of the custodial relationship.
- The court declined to recognize a new state constitutional tort remedy under Part I, Article 2 where common-law remedies were available.

## Legal Principles

- A statute supports a private civil action only when the legislature intended—expressly or by clear implication—to create civil liability for its violation.
- Negligence per se may supply a standard of care for an existing common-law claim only when the statutory duty matches the duty at issue and the plaintiff and harm fall within the statute’s protective scope.
- Schools have a special relationship with students entrusted to their care, creating a duty of reasonable supervision; that duty attaches to employees with supervisory responsibility who have knowledge (actual or constructive) making abuse reasonably apparent.
- The existence and scope of a special-relationship duty track the custodial/supervisory relationship; when that relationship ends, the special-relationship duty generally ends as well.
- Courts may refuse to imply a direct constitutional damages action when traditional tort remedies provide an adequate avenue for relief.

## Conclusion

The court clarified that New Hampshire’s child-abuse reporting statute does not itself create civil liability or establish negligence per se for supervision claims, recognized a limited common-law duty of reasonable supervision owed by supervisory school employees who know or should know of abuse, confined that duty to the school custodial relationship, and rejected an implied damages remedy directly under the state constitution.


Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995)