## Facts

- Steven Richard Marquiz, Rudy Gallegos, and Antonio Laroza were charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder for the killing of 17-year-old Debra Terhorst.
- Evidence at Marquiz’s trial indicated Marquiz believed Terhorst stole property from his apartment, decided to kill her, and enlisted Gallegos and Laroza.
- The three men induced Terhorst to go to Lookout Mountain, where she was stabbed multiple times and her throat was cut, causing death.
- The defendants’ cases were severed and tried separately.
- In separate trials, Gallegos was convicted of first-degree murder but acquitted of conspiracy; Laroza was acquitted of both murder and conspiracy.
- After delays from competency/insanity proceedings, a jury convicted Marquiz of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant’s conspiracy conviction must be reversed when the only alleged coconspirators were acquitted of conspiracy in earlier, separate trials (the common-law “rule of consistency”).

## Decision

- The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upholding Marquiz’s conspiracy conviction.
- The court held the “rule of consistency” is inapplicable when alleged coconspirators are not tried in the same proceeding.
- The court concluded that acquittals in separate trials did not preclude the later conviction of Marquiz for conspiracy based on the record and verdict in his own trial.

## Legal Principles

- The common-law “rule of consistency,” if recognized, addresses inconsistent conspiracy verdicts returned by the same jury in a single joint trial.
- Separate trials may produce different outcomes without legal inconsistency because different juries may hear different evidence and make different credibility and proof assessments.
- An acquittal reflects the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in that proceeding; it is not a binding determination that no conspiracy existed for other proceedings.
- Extending a consistency requirement across separate trials would improperly allow an earlier acquittal—possibly erroneous—to invalidate later, otherwise supported convictions.
- When the rule of consistency is inapplicable due to separate trials, the court need not decide whether the prosecution must identify an unindicted coconspirator or whether state law follows a unilateral conspiracy theory.

## Conclusion

Because the alleged coconspirators were tried separately, their conspiracy acquittals did not bar Marquiz’s conspiracy conviction; the rule of consistency applies, if at all, only to joint trials, and Marquiz’s convictions and concurrent sentences remained in effect.


Marquiz v. People, 726 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1986)