## Facts

- Marsh (plaintiff) worked for Illinois Central Railroad (defendant) as a locomotive fireman.
- Marsh was injured in the course of his railroad work and claimed the Railroad’s negligence caused his injuries.
- Marsh sued the Railroad for damages based on negligence.
- After both sides presented all evidence, the Railroad moved for a directed verdict.
- The trial judge denied the directed-verdict motion, and the case went to the jury.
- The jury returned a verdict for Marsh.
- The Railroad then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial.
- The Railroad argued, among other things, that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the evidence.
- The trial judge entered JNOV for the Railroad, stating that “[t]he weight of the evidence is so overwhelmingly against the plaintiff that as a matter of law” judgment had to be entered for the Railroad.
- The trial judge also stated that the directed-verdict motion should have been granted because there was not enough evidence to send the case to the jury, but concluded there were “no other errors of law” warranting a new trial.
- Marsh appealed the JNOV. The Railroad appealed the denial of its alternative motion for a new trial.

## Issues

1. May a district court enter JNOV for the defendant on the ground that the verdict is against the “weight of the evidence,” even though there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff?
2. Was the evidence legally sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury, making JNOV improper?
3. If JNOV was improper, did the district court err in refusing to grant the Railroad a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence?

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s entry of JNOV for the Railroad.
- The court held that “weight of the evidence” is not the test for JNOV; that consideration may support a new trial, but it does not authorize judgment contrary to the verdict when the record contains legally sufficient evidence for the jury’s finding.
- Viewing the evidence under the proper standard for JNOV (drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict and without reweighing credibility), the court concluded there was enough evidence to submit negligence and causation to the jury.
- Because the trial judge had denied a new trial and identified no trial error warranting one, the Fifth Circuit did not order a new trial and instead directed that the jury’s verdict be given effect.
- On the Railroad’s appeal from the denial of a new trial, the Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial.

## Legal Principles

- JNOV (and a directed verdict) is proper only when, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party.
- In deciding JNOV, the court does not weigh evidence, assess witness credibility, or choose among competing inferences; those tasks belong to the jury.
- A claim that a verdict is against the “weight of the evidence” is addressed, if at all, through a motion for a new trial, which rests largely in the trial court’s discretion.
- An appellate court will reverse a JNOV entered under an improper standard (such as substituting weight-of-the-evidence review for legal sufficiency) and will generally respect the trial court’s discretionary ruling on a new-trial motion absent a clear abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit held that the district court improperly displaced the jury’s verdict by entering JNOV based on the “weight of the evidence.” Because there was legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find the Railroad negligent and to find causation, judgment as a matter of law was not permitted; any concern about evidentiary weight belonged, at most, in a discretionary new-trial analysis. The court therefore reversed the JNOV and allowed the plaintiff’s verdict to stand, while finding no basis to overturn the denial of a new trial.


Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R., 175 F.2d 498 (1949)