## Facts

- William J. Martin drove a horse-drawn buggy on a public highway at night, more than an hour after sundown.
- A New York statute required nighttime lights on such vehicles; Martin’s buggy displayed no lights.
- Samuel A. Herzog drove an automobile and collided with Martin’s buggy, killing Martin.
- Martin’s estate alleged Herzog was negligent, including by driving on the wrong side of the road.
- Herzog asserted contributory negligence based on Martin’s statutory violation (operating without required lights).
- The trial court instructed the jury that the absence of lights was not negligence in itself and could be treated as “innocent or as culpable.”

## Issues

1. Whether an unexcused violation of a safety statute is negligence in itself (negligence per se) rather than merely evidence for the jury to weigh.
2. Whether the statutory violation can constitute contributory negligence only if it was a contributing cause of the collision.
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by instructing that operating without lights was not negligence in itself.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order granting a new trial.
- The court held that the unexcused failure to display statutory lights was negligence per se, and the jury could not treat the violation as potentially “innocent.”
- The court held that causation remained required, and the evidence permitted an inference that the lack of lights contributed to the collision.
- The jury charge was prejudicially erroneous because it denied the legal effect of the statutory violation and improperly gave the jury discretion to nullify the statutory duty.

## Legal Principles

- Unexcused violation of a safety statute setting a standard of conduct constitutes negligence as a matter of law.
- A jury has no authority to relax or disregard a statutory duty by treating a statutory breach as consistent with reasonable care.
- A statutory violation bars recovery as contributory negligence only if it was a contributing cause of the injury.
- A statutory breach may be avoided as negligence per se if a legally sufficient excuse or functional equivalent compliance is supported by the case as tried.
- Proper instructions may describe the violation as prima facie evidence of contributory negligence—sufficient to support a finding of fault unless its probative force is overcome (e.g., by lack of causal connection or excuse).

## Conclusion

The court required a new trial because the jury was incorrectly told it could treat the decedent’s unexcused statutory violation as non-negligent; the violation was negligence per se, though the jury still had to determine whether that negligence contributed to the collision.


Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920)