## Facts

- On June 20, 1972, two cars collided at an intersection in Providence, Rhode Island.
- One car was owned by George B. Bibeault and was being driven by Karen Martin; Beatrice Bibeault was a passenger.
- The other car was driven by Maria Lilly and was alleged to be owned by Dean Auto Body, Inc. (“Dean”).
- The collision generated three District Court actions:
  - George Bibeault sued Dean for property damage to his car.
  - Maria Lilly and her husband, Moses Lilly, sued George Bibeault and Karen Martin.
  - Karen Martin, George Bibeault, and Beatrice Bibeault sued Maria Lilly and Dean for personal injuries.
- The cases were consolidated for trial in District Court and later remained consolidated in Superior Court.
- The claims against Dean were brought under G.L. 1956 § 31-33-6, which imposes liability on a vehicle owner for negligence by a person operating the vehicle with the owner’s consent.
- Dean filed a general denial in the property-damage action but did not file an answer in the personal-injury action.
- After trial in District Court, judgments entered that included awards against Maria Lilly and Dean in favor of George and Beatrice Bibeault; Karen Martin received nominal damages against Maria Lilly; Maria and Moses Lilly recovered nothing.
- Dean appealed the adverse judgments to the Superior Court and requested a jury trial; Maria Lilly did not appeal and did not attend the Superior Court trial, though she was represented by counsel.
- At the Superior Court trial, Karen Martin testified that after the collision she asked Maria Lilly for her license and registration; Maria gave her the license but stated that the car “belonged to Dean Auto Body.” Dean objected on hearsay grounds, and the objection was overruled.
- After the plaintiffs rested and the defense had already begun presenting witnesses, Dean moved to amend its pleadings to assert lack of ownership and lack of consent. The trial justice denied the motion, noting Dean had never answered the personal-injury complaint.
- At the close of the evidence, Dean moved for a directed verdict, arguing the plaintiffs failed to prove Dean’s ownership because Martin’s testimony about Lilly’s statement was the only evidence of ownership. The trial justice denied the motion.
- The jury returned verdicts for Martin and the Bibeaults against Dean, and Dean appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial justice erred by admitting Karen Martin’s testimony that Maria Lilly said at the accident scene that the vehicle “belonged to Dean Auto Body.”
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Dean owned the vehicle for purposes of liability under § 31-33-6, and thus whether the directed-verdict motion was properly denied.
3. Whether the trial justice abused discretion by denying Dean’s mid-trial motion to amend its pleadings to add defenses of lack of ownership and lack of consent.

## Decision

- The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment entered on the jury’s verdicts for the plaintiffs.
- The Court upheld the trial justice’s handling of the challenged testimony about the driver’s statement identifying Dean as the owner.
- The Court held that the evidence, viewed in the manner required on a directed-verdict motion, permitted the jury to find ownership and to impose statutory owner liability.
- The Court held the trial justice acted within discretion in denying Dean’s late motion to amend, particularly given the timing and Dean’s failure to file an answer in the personal-injury action.

## Legal Principles

- Under G.L. 1956 § 31-33-6, a motor-vehicle owner may be held liable for injuries caused by a person operating the vehicle with the owner’s consent.
- When reviewing denial of a directed verdict, the court views the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; the motion is denied if reasonable jurors could find for that party on the disputed elements.
- Trial courts have broad discretion to allow or deny amendments to pleadings, and a late amendment offered after the opposing party has rested—especially when key defenses were not timely raised—may be denied to avoid unfairness and disruption of trial.
- In an owner-liability case, testimony that the driver identified the vehicle’s owner at the scene may be considered by the factfinder on the question of ownership, and admission of such evidence will not warrant reversal when the verdict is supported under the applicable trial standards.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed verdicts against Dean Auto Body because the Superior Court properly allowed the jury to consider the accident-scene statement identifying Dean as the owner, properly denied a directed verdict where the evidence permitted a finding of ownership under § 31-33-6, and acted within its discretion in refusing Dean’s belated attempt to add lack-of-ownership and lack-of-consent defenses after the plaintiffs had rested.


Martin v. Lilly, 505 A.2d 1156 (1986)