## Facts

- The Maryland Stadium Authority (MSA), a state-created public corporation, was charged with planning, building, and operating a Baltimore sports complex, including a new baseball park.
- The stadium site was in an area long known as “Camden Yards,” and MSA and others used “Camden Yards” in brochures, newsletters, and promotional events to identify and publicize the forthcoming ballpark.
- During 1991, substantial public discussion focused on naming the new park; the officially announced name later became “Oriole Park at Camden Yards.”
- In July 1991, Roy G. Becker began selling baseball-themed T-shirts and other apparel using “Camden Yards,” including the phrase “Camden Yards means baseball,” with Baltimore references and Orioles-related imagery.
- Becker sold the merchandise near the Orioles’ then-home stadium and through other channels, including direct mail and local advertising, and he did business as “Camden Yards Stadium.”
- In August 1991, MSA demanded Becker stop using “Camden Yards”; Becker continued, and MSA sued under Lanham Act § 43(a) and Maryland common-law unfair competition.
- After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether MSA acquired enforceable rights in the unregistered mark “Camden Yards” through pre-opening advertising and promotion for a forthcoming sports facility and related services.
2. Whether Becker’s use of “Camden Yards” on baseball-related apparel was likely to cause consumer confusion as to sponsorship or source under Lanham Act § 43(a) and Maryland unfair competition law.
3. Whether the parties’ activities satisfied the Lanham Act “use in commerce” requirement supporting federal jurisdiction.

## Decision

- The court denied Becker’s summary-judgment motion and granted MSA’s motion for partial summary judgment.
- The court held MSA had protectable rights in the unregistered “Camden Yards” mark based on substantial pre-opening promotional use that associated the mark with MSA’s forthcoming stadium services.
- The court held Becker’s apparel use was likely to cause confusion, including confusion about sponsorship or authorization, given the baseball-focused messaging, Orioles-related imagery, and sales to the relevant fan market.
- The court rejected Becker’s argument that the Lanham Act did not apply for lack of “use in commerce.”
- The court permanently enjoined Becker from using “Camden Yards” in connection with his merchandise.

## Legal Principles

- To prove infringement of an unregistered mark under Lanham Act § 43(a), a plaintiff must show (1) priority through adoption and legally cognizable use of the mark and (2) a likelihood of consumer confusion from the defendant’s use.
- Pre-opening advertising and promotional activity can constitute trademark/service-mark use sufficient to establish enforceable rights where the mark identifies a forthcoming facility or services and creates a source association in the relevant public.
- A geographically descriptive term may be protected upon a showing that it has acquired secondary meaning identifying a particular source.
- Intentional use of a designation closely associated with another’s project, combined with context suggesting sponsorship (including thematic design and proximity to the target consumer base), supports a finding of likely confusion.
- The Lanham Act “use in commerce” requirement is satisfied where the challenged activities have a sufficient nexus to commerce that Congress may regulate, including promotional and sales channels extending beyond purely local activity.

## Conclusion

The court concluded that MSA’s sustained promotional use of “Camden Yards” established priority and protectable rights in the unregistered mark for the stadium project and related services, and it enjoined Becker’s baseball-themed merchandise use because it was likely to cause confusion and satisfied the Lanham Act’s commerce requirement.


Maryland Stadium Auth. v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Md. 1992)