## Facts

- Jeffrey M. Masson, a psychoanalyst and former Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives, became a public critic of Freud and was dismissed from his Archives position.
- Journalist Janet Malcolm interviewed Masson in 1982; many interviews were tape-recorded.
- In 1983, *The New Yorker* published Malcolm’s two-part profile of Masson; in 1984, Alfred A. Knopf published an expanded book version.
- The publications used extensive passages presented as Masson’s verbatim statements in quotation marks.
- Masson alleged several “direct quotations” were fabricated or materially altered, portraying him as arrogant, venal, and unprofessional (e.g., claiming he called himself “the greatest analyst who ever lived”).
- Defendants asserted some disputed quotations derived from untaped conversations supported by contemporaneous notes, which Masson denied existed.
- Masson, concededly a public figure, sued for libel under California law, alleging defendants published false and defamatory quotations with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.

## Issues

1. Whether the First Amendment permits liability for deliberate alterations presented as direct quotations, and what constitutes “falsity” for a public-figure defamation claim.
2. Whether Masson produced sufficient evidence for a jury to find material falsity and publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard, making summary judgment improper.
3. Whether the “intellectual gigolo” quotation was actionable or barred (including under an “incremental harm” theory).

## Decision

- The Supreme Court rejected a rule that any deliberate alteration in quoted words automatically proves actual malice.
- The Court held that a fabricated or altered quotation may be actionable if it causes a material change in the meaning conveyed by what the speaker actually said.
- The Court held that, as to five of six challenged passages, the record could permit a jury to find material falsity and the requisite state of mind; summary judgment was improper as to those passages.
- The Court agreed that the “intellectual gigolo” passage was not actionable and, in any event, did not support liability under an incremental-harm rationale.
- The Court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- A public figure must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defamatory material was published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.
- The term “actual malice” refers to the defendant’s knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard, not ill will.
- Quotation marks signal to readers a near-verbatim rendering; attribution of specific wording can itself affect reputational harm.
- Deliberate alteration of quoted words does not establish constitutional falsity unless the alteration materially changes the factual meaning conveyed; minor editing and reconstruction are constitutionally tolerated.
- Summary judgment is inappropriate where evidence could allow a reasonable jury to find material falsity and the required knowledge or recklessness.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the Constitution does not immunize fabricated quotations attributed to a public figure when the alterations materially change meaning, but it also declined to treat all deviations from exact words as proof of liability; applying this standard, it required a jury trial on five disputed quotations and rejected one claim as nonactionable.


Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991)