## Facts

- A six-year-old child stood on a narrow ledge on the outside of a parked truck’s tailgate in an empty lot.
- A nine-year-old child told or urged her to get off; the six-year-old refused and cried that she was frightened.
- The nine-year-old deliberately pried the six-year-old’s fingers from the tailgate, causing her to fall to the ground and sustain severe injuries.
- The nine-year-old testified she acted to force the six-year-old to yield her place so the nine-year-old and her sister could take turns on the ledge and jump off.
- The injured child sued the nine-year-old for assault (an intentional tort), seeking damages.

## Issues

1. In an assault action, is it reversible error to instruct the jury that the plaintiff must prove the defendant intended the very injury sustained, rather than that the defendant intended an offensive or harmful bodily contact (or apprehension of such contact)?

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the defense verdict and ordered a new trial.
- The trial court’s charge incorrectly required proof that the child defendant intended the precise injury that occurred.
- The proper standard is satisfied if the defendant intended an offensive (even if not harmful) or harmful bodily contact, or intended to place the plaintiff in apprehension of such contact, even if the resulting bodily harm was not intended.

## Legal Principles

- Assault intent focuses on the intent to cause an offensive or harmful contact (or apprehension of it), not on intent to cause the particular resulting injury.
- If a defendant acts intending an offensive but not harmful contact (or apprehension of harmful/offensive contact) and bodily contact results, intent is established even though the defendant did not intend the resulting bodily harm.
- An erroneous jury instruction that narrows intent to require intent to cause the precise injury is reversible error when it is likely to have affected the verdict.

## Conclusion

The court held that assault does not require proof that the defendant intended the specific injury suffered; it is enough that the defendant intended an offensive or harmful contact (or apprehension of it) and contact occurred, so the jury charge requiring intent to cause the very injury warranted a new trial.


Masters v. Becker, 22 A.D.2d 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1964)