## Facts

- Dallas and Rebecca Masterson owned a ranch as tenants in common.
- They conveyed the ranch by grant deed to Lu and Medora Sine (Dallas’s sister and her husband), reserving an option for the grantors to repurchase by a stated date.
- The option price was described as the same consideration previously paid plus the depreciation value of later improvements after a stated period.
- The deed did not state whether the option was assignable or personal to the grantors.
- Dallas Masterson was later adjudicated bankrupt; his trustee and Rebecca sued for declaratory relief to confirm the right to exercise the option.
- The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence explaining the option-price terms (including that “same consideration” meant $50,000 and how depreciation would be calculated).
- The trial court excluded the Sines’ extrinsic evidence that the option was intended to keep the property in the Masterson family and thus was personal and not exercisable by the bankruptcy trustee.
- The trial court entered judgment for the trustee and Rebecca; the Sines appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the grant deed was a complete integration of the parties’ agreement regarding the option so as to bar extrinsic evidence of an alleged family-only, personal limitation.
2. Whether, given the deed’s silence on assignability, extrinsic evidence that the option was intended to be nonassignable and personal to the Mastersons was admissible.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
- The Court held the option language was not too uncertain to enforce and approved using extrinsic evidence to explain ambiguous pricing terms.
- The Court held the deed was not necessarily a complete integration of all terms concerning the option.
- The Court ruled the trial court erred by excluding the Sines’ extrinsic evidence of a family-only, personal limitation; that evidence should be considered by the trier of fact.

## Legal Principles

- The parol evidence rule applies only after determining whether the writing was intended as an integration (final expression) of the parties’ agreement.
- If a writing is only partially integrated, consistent additional terms may be proved by extrinsic evidence; only inconsistent terms are barred.
- In deciding completeness of integration, a court considers whether the omitted term is one that would certainly have been included in the writing; if the term might naturally be made as a separate agreement, extrinsic evidence is admissible.
- A deed’s silence on a term (including assignability) does not, by itself, establish that the writing fully integrated all related agreements.

## Conclusion

The court held that a grant deed reserving an option to repurchase was not necessarily the complete agreement as to all option terms and that extrinsic evidence of a personal, family-restricted, nonassignable option should have been admitted; because the exclusion prevented a proper determination of the parties’ intent, the judgment for the trustee and co-grantor was reversed and the case remanded.


Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222 (Cal. 1968)