## Facts

- Andrew R. was a 13-year-old boy described as intelligent and generally well behaved, with minor emotional difficulties.
- At his father’s urging, Andrew entered a residential treatment center on what was characterized as a voluntary placement.
- Andrew believed the placement would last about one month, but he remained at the center for about seven months without judicial review of whether continued placement was warranted.
- Andrew ran away from the center, returned home, and asked his father not to force him to return.
- When Andrew’s father insisted that Andrew go back to the center, Andrew threatened to kill his father; the father handed Andrew a knife and told him to do it, but Andrew did not act on the threat.
- The father filed a Family Court Act article 7 petition alleging Andrew was a person in need of supervision (PINS) because he was beyond the lawful control of his parents and was consistently truant from school.
- At the fact-finding hearing, only the father and Andrew testified.
- During Andrew’s testimony, the father’s attorney attempted to question Andrew about additional alleged misbehavior not specifically set forth in the petition.
- The guardian ad litem objected on legal and constitutional due process grounds, and the court sustained the objection.

## Issues

1. Whether, consistent with statutory pleading requirements and due process, a court may receive proof and base a PINS adjudication on alleged misconduct not specifically alleged in the petition.
2. Whether a child may be adjudicated a PINS based on refusing to comply with a directive that is unlawful or violates the child’s constitutional rights, including a demand to return to a residential placement maintained without judicial review.

## Decision

- The court sustained the guardian ad litem’s objection and refused to permit the petitioner to expand the case at fact-finding by proving unpleaded misconduct.
- The court held that PINS adjudication must be based on conduct specifically alleged in the petition so the child has adequate notice and an opportunity to defend.
- The court stated it is fundamental that a child may not be adjudicated a PINS for refusing to comply with a directive that violates the child’s constitutional rights or is otherwise unlawful.
- Applying those limits, the court declined to treat Andrew’s resistance to being returned to the residential facility—given the circumstances of the placement and lack of judicial review—as a proper basis for PINS relief, and the petition was not sustained.

## Legal Principles

- Although PINS proceedings are civil, they can result in significant restraints on a child’s liberty; therefore, constitutional due process requires fair notice of the specific acts alleged.
- A PINS petition must allege the underlying misconduct with sufficient specificity to permit the respondent child to prepare and present a defense.
- At fact-finding, proof must be confined to the misconduct pleaded; the petitioner may not use testimony to introduce new factual theories or uncharged acts as a basis for adjudication.
- A court may not use PINS jurisdiction to compel obedience to a directive that is unlawful or constitutionally defective; refusal to comply with such a directive is not a valid predicate for PINS status.

## Conclusion

*Matter of Andrew R.* limited PINS adjudications to the specific, pleaded conduct and held that a child cannot be labeled in need of supervision simply for refusing to comply with a directive that is unlawful or violates constitutional rights, particularly where the directive would force the child back into a prolonged residential placement without judicial review.


Matter of Andrew R., 115 Misc.2d 937 (1982)