## Facts

- Tyler James Larsen served as a county prosecutor in Utah and became the subject of disciplinary charges brought by the Utah State Bar’s Office of Professional Conduct (OPC).
- The disciplinary case involved two separate prosecutions and two different rules of professional conduct.
- First, in a DUI probation review matter, a dispute arose over fees and payments made by the probationer.
- During a sidebar in that matter, Larsen told the court that he had a spreadsheet reflecting roughly $6,000 in payments and stated that his supervisor did not want the information disclosed.
- The disciplinary tribunal found those sidebar statements were false: the spreadsheet Larsen described did not exist at the time, and he had not been instructed by his supervisor to keep the information from the court.
- The tribunal also found Larsen did not intentionally lie; it characterized the sidebar statements as reckless misstatements rather than a knowing falsehood.
- Second, in a separate felony robbery case that depended heavily on eyewitness identification, Larsen met with two eyewitnesses about ten days before trial and showed each of them a single photograph of the accused.
- Larsen did not disclose the pretrial photo viewing to the defense before trial, even though the defense could have used it to challenge the reliability of in-court identifications and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
- At trial, one eyewitness testified in a way that denied having seen a photo of the defendant before trial; Larsen did not correct that testimony at the time.
- When the second eyewitness later testified that she had been shown a photo, Larsen acknowledged on the record that he had shown the witnesses a photograph.
- The OPC charged Larsen with violating Rule 3.3(a)(1) (candor to the tribunal) based on the DUI sidebar statements and Rule 3.8(d) (special responsibilities of a prosecutor) based on the late disclosure of the photo viewing in the robbery case.
- The disciplinary tribunal found violations of both rules and imposed consecutive suspensions totaling seven months (a short suspension tied to Rule 3.3 and a longer suspension tied to Rule 3.8(d)).
- Larsen appealed, arguing (among other things) that Rule 3.3(a)(1) requires actual knowledge of falsity and that his disclosure in the robbery case was timely because it satisfied Brady.

## Issues

1. Whether a reckless misstatement—where the tribunal found no knowing or intentional falsehood—can support discipline under Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1), which prohibits “knowingly” making a false statement to a tribunal.
2. Whether Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) requires earlier disclosure of exculpatory evidence than the constitutional minimum under Brady, and whether Larsen’s disclosure at trial was “timely.”
3. What discipline was appropriate in light of the court’s interpretation of Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 3.8(d).

## Decision

- The Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 3.3(a)(1) requires proof the lawyer made the false statement knowingly—actual knowledge of falsity—not merely recklessly.
- Because the tribunal expressly found Larsen’s DUI sidebar statements were reckless but not knowing, the Supreme Court vacated the Rule 3.3(a)(1) violation.
- The court rejected the argument that “knowingly” in Rule 3.3(a)(1) can be treated as satisfied by reckless statements made without a reasonable basis.
- The court affirmed that Larsen violated Rule 3.8(d) by failing to make timely disclosure to the defense of the pretrial eyewitness photo viewing in the robbery prosecution.
- The court concluded Rule 3.8(d) sets an ethical disclosure duty that is not limited to Brady’s constitutional floor and can require disclosure early enough for meaningful use by the defense.
- The court upheld discipline tied to the Rule 3.8(d) violation and sent the matter back for entry of a disposition consistent with its rulings, including removal of discipline based solely on the vacated Rule 3.3 finding.

## Legal Principles

- Under Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1), “knowingly” means actual knowledge that a statement is false; recklessness alone does not satisfy the rule.
- Disciplinary liability under Rule 3.3(a)(1) cannot rest on a tribunal finding that expressly rejects a knowing false statement.
- Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) imposes a prosecutor-specific duty to disclose exculpatory evidence that can extend beyond what Brady requires as a matter of constitutional law.
- “Timely disclosure” under Rule 3.8(d) is measured by whether the defense receives exculpatory information soon enough to prepare and use it effectively, not merely by whether disclosure occurs before a conviction becomes constitutionally infirm.
- When a prosecutor has information bearing on the reliability of eyewitness identification—such as a suggestive pretrial photo viewing—Rule 3.8(d) can require disclosure before trial rather than mid-trial after testimony has already been given.

## Conclusion

Matter of Larsen held that Utah’s Rule 3.3(a)(1) does not permit discipline for false statements to a court without proof of actual knowledge of falsity, so the court vacated the candor violation based on reckless misstatements in a DUI probation matter; at the same time, the court affirmed discipline under Rule 3.8(d) because the prosecutor’s pretrial showing of a single photo to eyewitnesses and his failure to inform the defense until trial was not timely disclosure of exculpatory information, even if he argued it satisfied Brady.


Matter of Larsen, 2016 UT 26 (2016)