## Facts

- Niki Rossakis was convicted in 1996 of second-degree murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon for shooting and killing her husband in 1993.
- At trial, she asserted she acted out of fear after long-term physical and sexual abuse; the jury was instructed on justification and extreme emotional disturbance.
- Her original sentence of 23 years to life was reduced on appeal to 15 years to life, the statutory minimum for second-degree murder.
- While incarcerated, Rossakis earned two associate degrees, completed available rehabilitative programming, performed constructive institutional roles, and received a low-risk COMPAS assessment.
- She became parole eligible in 2009 and was denied parole in 2009 and 2011.
- In a 2013 parole interview, she presented extensive rehabilitation evidence and release plans, expressed remorse, and continued to describe herself as a domestic-violence victim.
- The Board denied parole in 2013, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense and concluding she lacked appropriate remorse because she continued to portray herself as a victim.
- Rossakis brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the 2013 denial as arbitrary and capricious for failure to consider statutory factors under Executive Law § 259-i.
- Supreme Court annulled the denial and ordered a de novo hearing, also directing the Board to focus on forward-looking statutory factors.
- The Board appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department.

## Issues

1. Whether the 2013 parole denial was arbitrary and capricious under Executive Law § 259-i because it relied almost exclusively on the offense and an asserted lack of remorse, without meaningful consideration of rehabilitation and other statutory factors.
2. Whether the Supreme Court exceeded its authority by directing how the Board must weigh statutory factors at the new parole hearing.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division modified the judgment.
- The court affirmed annulment of the 2013 parole denial, holding it was “so irrational as to border on impropriety” and therefore arbitrary and capricious.
- The court vacated the portion of the judgment directing how the Board must weigh the statutory factors.
- The matter was remanded for a new parole hearing consistent with the statutory criteria and the court’s opinion, without judicial direction on relative weight.

## Legal Principles

- Under Executive Law § 259-i, the Board must consider all required factors, including but not limited to the seriousness of the offense, institutional record, program participation, release plans, and risk of recidivism (including risk-assessment instruments).
- Parole review is forward-looking; after service of the minimum term, the Board may not effectively re-sentence by basing denial solely or nearly solely on offense seriousness.
- A parole determination may be set aside as arbitrary and capricious where it is “so irrational as to border on impropriety,” including where statutory factors are merely recited without analysis.
- Courts may annul an unlawful parole denial and order a new hearing, but may not substitute their judgment for the Board’s by dictating how the Board should balance statutory factors.

## Conclusion

The court set aside the parole denial because the Board’s reasoning centered almost entirely on the homicide and an unsupported view of insufficient remorse, despite substantial evidence of rehabilitation and low risk, but it limited the remedy to a remand for a new hearing without judicial instructions on how the Board must weigh the statutory factors.


Matter of Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016)