## Facts

- L.J.M. was born in May 2010 to Adrianne Bergsieker (mother) and Nathan Joseph McAllister (genetic father).
- Philip Bergsieker began a relationship with Adrianne when L.J.M. was about four years old and became part of the child’s life in July 2014.
- About a year later, Adrianne and Bergsieker married and began living together with L.J.M. as a single household.
- Bergsieker alleged that he acted as a parent in day-to-day life, including providing financial support and taking part in education and medical matters.
- L.J.M. referred to Bergsieker as his “dad.”
- School staff, medical providers, and family friends knew Bergsieker was L.J.M.’s stepfather, but they looked to Adrianne and Bergsieker (not McAllister) for parenting decisions.
- When Bergsieker petitioned for de facto parentage in March 2019 under RCW 26.26A.440, McAllister was incarcerated and had no physical custody, legal custody, or court-ordered visitation.
- Bergsieker sought recognition as a de facto parent, which would make him an additional legal parent.
- McAllister opposed the petition. The trial court dismissed it at the threshold stage for lack of standing, concluding Bergsieker failed to allege two of the statute’s requirements: (1) “full and permanent” parental responsibilities because McAllister was still living, and (2) “held out” because L.J.M. had a different last name and the community knew Bergsieker as a stepfather.

## Issues

1. Whether a petition can adequately allege RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c)’s requirement that the petitioner undertook “full and permanent responsibilities of a parent” when a living genetic parent exists.
2. Whether a petition can adequately allege RCW 26.26A.440(4)(d)’s “held out the child as the individual’s child” element when the child has a different surname and others know the petitioner is a stepfather.
3. Whether, at the standing stage, it is material to ask if the mother supported the petitioner’s relationship with the child “at the expense” of the genetic father.

## Decision

- The Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, reversed the dismissal and remanded.
- The court held the trial court erred by treating the existence of a living genetic father as defeating, as a matter of law, the “permanent” responsibilities element at the pleading/standing stage.
- The court held the trial court also erred by concluding the “held out” element could not be met because the child’s surname differed and the community knew Bergsieker was a stepfather; “held out” concerns presenting oneself in a parental role, not claiming genetic parentage.
- The court rejected the trial court’s added requirement that the mother’s support of the relationship must not have occurred “at the expense” of McAllister; that limitation does not appear in RCW 26.26A.440 and was not a proper basis to deny standing on the pleadings.
- On remand, the trial court was directed to determine whether Bergsieker could prove the statutory elements of de facto parentage by a preponderance of the evidence.

## Legal Principles

- RCW 26.26A.440 establishes a two-step framework: (1) standing based on allegations that, if proven, would satisfy each statutory element, and (2) a later merits determination where the elements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
- RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c) does not impose an exclusivity rule; alleging “full and permanent” parental responsibilities is not legally barred simply because another legal or genetic parent is alive.
- RCW 26.26A.440(4)(d) does not require the petitioner to claim biological parentage, share the child’s surname, or convince the community that the petitioner is the genetic parent; it requires allegations showing the petitioner publicly acted in a parental capacity.
- Courts should not add extra-statutory conditions to standing under RCW 26.26A.440, such as requiring a showing that the legal parent’s support of the relationship did not reduce another parent’s role.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals held that Bergsieker’s petition alleged sufficient facts to proceed with a de facto parentage action under RCW 26.26A.440 and that the trial court erred by reading “permanent” and “held out” too narrowly and by adding a nonstatutory “at the expense” limitation; the case was reversed and remanded for an evidentiary determination on whether Bergsieker could prove the statutory elements by a preponderance of the evidence.


Matter of the Parentage of L.J.M., 476 P.3d 636 (2020)