## Facts

- William W. McBoyle operated a commercial airport in Galena, Illinois.
- McBoyle hired A. J. Lacey as an aviator for a six-month term.
- McBoyle induced Lacey to steal a Waco airplane owned by the United States Aircraft Corporation from Ottawa, Illinois.
- After Lacey flew the stolen airplane to Galena, McBoyle altered the airplane’s serial number and painted over the changes to conceal the alteration.
- McBoyle paid Lacey and directed him to fly the airplane from Illinois toward Texas; Lacey flew with stops in Missouri and Kansas and ultimately reached Guymon, Oklahoma.
- McBoyle communicated with Lacey by telegraph and instructed him to sell or store the stolen airplane at Guymon and return to Galena.
- McBoyle later instructed Lacey to fly a different but similar airplane to Guymon to substitute it for the stolen aircraft; Lacey crashed en route.
- A federal indictment charged McBoyle with causing the interstate transportation of the stolen Waco airplane, knowing it was stolen, in violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (Dyer Act).

## Issues

1. Whether an airplane qualifies as a “motor vehicle” under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act’s definition covering “any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.”
2. Whether the indictment and proof were sufficient to show McBoyle caused interstate transportation of the stolen aircraft and that the aircraft was adequately described and tied to ownership.
3. Whether any asserted trial errors required reversal.

## Decision

- The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
- The court held that an airplane falls within the Act’s residual category of “any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.”
- The court found the indictment sufficient and the evidence adequate to show McBoyle caused the aircraft’s interstate transportation knowing it was stolen.
- The court found no reversible trial error.

## Legal Principles

- Under the Dyer Act as then written, the term “motor vehicle” includes specifically listed land vehicles and also “any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.”
- A defendant may be convicted for “caus[ing] to be transported” a covered vehicle in interstate commerce when the evidence supports that the defendant directed, financed, or otherwise procured the interstate movement of the stolen property.
- Broad residual statutory language may be construed to reach conveyances not expressly listed when they satisfy the definition’s functional criteria (self-propelled and not rail-designed), absent an express exclusion.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit upheld McBoyle’s Dyer Act conviction by reading the statute’s catch-all definition of “motor vehicle” to include an airplane and by concluding the indictment, evidence, and trial proceedings supported the finding that McBoyle caused the interstate transportation of a stolen aircraft with knowledge it was stolen.


McBoyle v. United States, 43 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1930)