## Facts

- Three suspected Provisional IRA members (Daniel McCann, Mairéad Farrell, and Seán Savage) were fatally shot by British Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers in Gibraltar on March 6, 1988 during “Operation Flavius.”
- UK, Spanish, and Gibraltar authorities received intelligence that the suspects intended to carry out a car bomb attack near a crowded changing-of-the-guard ceremony.
- Authorities believed the bomb could be detonated by remote control or a push-button device carried by the suspects, creating a perceived risk of immediate mass casualties if the suspects were challenged.
- SAS soldiers were briefed that the suspects might detonate instantly and were deployed under rules of engagement that permitted lethal force if the soldiers believed there was an immediate threat of detonation.
- The suspects entered Gibraltar from Spain, parked a car, and walked through town; when confronted separately, each was shot multiple times after soldiers believed they were reaching for a detonator.
- No weapons or detonating devices were found on the bodies, and no remote-control device was found in the parked car.
- Explosives later discovered were configured as a delayed-action timed bomb, suggesting the suspects were not poised for immediate detonation at the moment they were confronted.
- A Gibraltar inquest returned majority verdicts of lawful killing; later civil claims against the Ministry of Defence were barred by statutory certificates.

## Issues

1. Whether the use of lethal force against the three suspects was “no more than absolutely necessary” under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. Whether Article 2 review requires assessing not only the soldiers’ split-second decision to shoot but also the planning, control, and organization of the operation that led to the confrontation.
3. Whether an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief of imminent threat can justify lethal force under Article 2(2).

## Decision

- The court found a violation of Article 2 by a narrow majority (10–9).
- The violation was based on deficiencies in the control, planning, and organization of the operation, which did not sufficiently minimize recourse to lethal force.
- The court did not find an Article 2 violation in the individual soldiers’ actions, accepting that they honestly and reasonably believed shooting was necessary to prevent an imminent detonation, even though that belief later proved mistaken.

## Legal Principles

- Article 2 imposes a stringent standard: lethal force by state agents must be “no more than absolutely necessary,” requiring strict proportionality.
- Article 2 review extends beyond the moment of firing to the state’s prior decisions in planning, intelligence assessment, command, and operational control that may make lethal force more likely.
- Lethal force may be justified where agents act on an honest belief, supported by good reasons at the time, that it is necessary to defend life, even if later information shows the belief was mistaken.
- A state may still breach Article 2 if it fails to organize and control a security operation so as to reduce, to the greatest extent possible, the need for lethal force and the risk to life.
- Relevant planning failures can include not arresting at an earlier, safer stage, insufficient critical assessment of intelligence about the immediacy of the threat, and operational choices (including briefings and engagement rules) that make lethal force highly likely when suspects are confronted.

## Conclusion

The court held that the state violated the right to life because the operation’s planning and control increased the risk of lethal force and did not adequately limit it to last resort, even though the soldiers who fired acted on an honest and reasonable belief that they faced an imminent threat.


McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 27, 1995)