## Facts

- Chicago police investigated the kidnapping of Adalberto Valdavia and tracked ransom calls with assistance from Ameritech and Cellular One.
- The calls appeared to originate from a cloned cellular phone, based on simultaneous activity from different locations.
- Cellular One told officers it could monitor calls involving the cloned phone and approximate its location.
- Officers requested that Cellular One monitor calls on the cloned phone and relay information helpful to locating the kidnapper; no judicial wiretap order was obtained.
- Cellular One intercepted a call in which the caller told a lifeguard station he would not be coming to work; the information was relayed to officers.
- Police identified the caller as Michael McClelland and arrested him after Valdavia was released.
- McClelland’s kidnapping prosecution was later terminated, and he sued officers and the City of Chicago for damages under the federal Wiretap Act.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment on the Wiretap Act claim.

## Issues

1. Whether officers violated Title III by procuring a cellular provider’s warrantless interception and disclosure of call contents during a criminal investigation.
2. Whether the interception fell within Title III’s service-provider exception or any other statutory authorization.
3. Whether officers and the City could face Title III liability when the provider performed the technical interception but officers requested, directed, and used the results.

## Decision

- The court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Wiretap Act claim.
- The court held the interception was not authorized by a Title III wiretap order and did not qualify for the service-provider exception.
- The court ruled that Title III can impose liability on those who procure or use the contents of an unlawful interception, not only on those who technically perform it.

## Legal Principles

- Title III generally prohibits intentional interception of electronic communications absent statutory authorization; exceptions are construed narrowly.
- The service-provider exception applies when a provider intercepts communications as a necessary incident to service or to protect the provider’s rights or property (e.g., fraud prevention), not when the primary aim is assisting law enforcement investigation.
- Law enforcement may be liable under Title III for procuring a provider to intercept communications and for intentionally obtaining or using the intercepted contents, even if the provider operated the interception equipment.
- Police cannot avoid Title III’s judicial-authorization requirement by outsourcing surveillance to a communications provider under the guise of provider self-protection.

## Conclusion

The court held that officers who requested and used a cellular provider’s warrantless monitoring of a cloned phone during a kidnapping investigation could be liable under the Wiretap Act because the service-provider exception did not cover an interception primarily undertaken to aid law enforcement.


McClelland v. McGrath, 31 F. Supp. 2d 616 (N.D. Ill. 1998)