## Facts

- Glenn A. Cooley parked his car in a publicly accessible shopping-center parking lot and left the keys in the ignition while he went into a bank.
- A thief stole the car and was pursued by police in a high-speed chase through a heavily trafficked area.
- The thief ran a red light at high speed and struck a vehicle driven by William Hall Paxton McClenahan’s pregnant wife.
- The collision killed McClenahan’s wife and two children and caused serious injuries to another child; a child delivered after the collision later died.
- McClenahan sued Cooley for wrongful death and personal injuries, alleging Cooley was negligent, including by violating a statute prohibiting leaving an unattended vehicle with the key in the ignition.
- The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for Cooley, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed on the ground that the thief’s criminal acts were a superseding intervening cause.
- The case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court on whether proximate causation should be decided by a jury in this setting.

## Issues

1. Whether leaving keys in the ignition of an unattended vehicle in a publicly accessible location, in violation of a safety statute, can support negligence liability for harm caused after the vehicle is stolen.
2. Whether the thief’s theft and reckless driving constituted a superseding intervening cause as a matter of law, or whether proximate cause and intervening cause were questions for the jury.

## Decision

- The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the pleadings and remanded for further proceedings.
- Accepting the complaint’s well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences as true, the court held reasonable minds could differ on foreseeability and causation.
- The court ruled that proximate cause and intervening/superseding cause were ordinarily for the jury on these allegations, and dismissal at the pleading stage was improper.

## Legal Principles

- On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts must accept the nonmovant’s well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences as true, and grant judgment only when the movant is clearly entitled to it.
- A statutory prohibition against leaving an unattended vehicle without removing the key is evidence of a duty and legislative recognition that theft and resulting accidents are foreseeable risks.
- Proximate cause in Tennessee incorporates foreseeability and policy; it is generally a fact question for the jury, including where the alleged negligence may have set the stage for later harm.
- An intervening criminal act does not automatically break the chain of causation; if the intervening act is among the risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent, it may be treated as foreseeable and not superseding.
- Liability should not turn on formal distinctions between public and private property when the alleged risk of theft and subsequent injury is reasonably foreseeable in either setting.

## Conclusion

The court held that a vehicle owner who leaves keys in an unattended car in violation of a safety statute is not insulated from liability as a matter of law merely because a thief later steals the car and causes a crash; on the pleaded facts, negligence, proximate cause, and superseding cause were for a jury to decide.


McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1991)