## Facts

- Peter Clayton McClendon, a private citizen, was shot in the face and permanently blinded by Kevin Loftin.
- Loftin was a confidential informant working with the City of Columbia Police Department under Detective James R. Carney’s supervision.
- Loftin told Carney he feared retaliation from McClendon.
- Carney gave Loftin a handgun from his desk for protection.
- About a week later, Loftin used that handgun during an altercation to shoot McClendon.
- McClendon alleged Carney knowingly increased the risk of violence by arming Loftin despite awareness that a confrontation was likely.
- McClendon sued Detective Carney and the City of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting substantive due process (state-created danger) and municipal liability theories (failure to train; customs/policies concerning informant use and unsecured storage of weapons/evidence).
- The district court granted summary judgment for Carney and the City, and McClendon appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether, viewing the summary-judgment record in McClendon’s favor, Carney’s act of providing a gun to an informant who later shot McClendon violated McClendon’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to bodily integrity under a state-created danger theory.
2. If a constitutional violation could be shown, whether Carney was entitled to qualified immunity because the relevant law was not clearly established in 1993.
3. Whether the City of Columbia could be liable under § 1983 for failure to train or for customs/policies regarding informant handling and storage of weapons/evidence.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit (en banc) affirmed summary judgment for Detective Carney.
- The court held that, on the summary-judgment facts taken in McClendon’s favor, Carney’s conduct did not amount to a federal constitutional violation.
- In the alternative, the court held that even if a constitutional violation were assumed, Carney was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct was not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law in 1993.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for the City of Columbia and reinstated the prior panel’s resolution of the municipal-liability issues.

## Legal Principles

- The Due Process Clause generally does not impose an affirmative federal constitutional duty on the state to protect individuals from private violence; exceptions are limited.
- A state-created danger theory, to the extent recognized, requires sufficiently direct and culpable state action closely tied to the harm; negligent or ill-considered conduct does not, without more, establish a substantive due process violation.
- Qualified immunity protects an officer unless the unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly established at the time, such that the officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable under then-existing law.
- Municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of an official policy or custom (or a failure to train amounting to deliberate indifference) that was the moving force behind a constitutional injury; absent an actionable underlying constitutional violation and sufficient proof of policy/custom or deliberate indifference, the municipality is not liable.

## Conclusion

The en banc court held that lending a handgun to an informant who later used it to blind a private citizen did not, on the record presented, constitute a substantive due process violation; and even if it did, the officer was protected by qualified immunity because the asserted right was not clearly established in 1993. The City also escaped liability because the proof did not satisfy Monell requirements for an actionable policy, custom, or deliberately indifferent training tied to a constitutional injury.


McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)