## Facts

- Mary V. Nowling Elliott, an elderly woman who could neither read nor write, owned an undivided one-fifth interest in the minerals under a 75-acre tract of land. ()  
- In January 1972, B.G. Russell offered to buy Elliott’s entire mineral interest, but she refused. ()  
- Elliott orally agreed instead to sell Russell only two of the approximately 13–15 mineral acres she owned for $3,300. ()  
- Russell prepared a mineral deed that, instead of conveying two mineral acres as agreed, stated that Elliott was conveying a “one-fifth (1/5) interest in and to all the oil, gas, and other minerals” under the 75 acres—effectively 15 mineral acres, which Elliott had consistently refused to sell. ()  
- Elliott lived with her daughter, who could read and superficially reviewed the deed; although she did not understand it, she told Elliott that it “guessed” to be all right, and Elliott signed. ()  
- A few days later, Russell told Elliott he had made a mistake and offered to pay her $15,000 for the interest conveyed; Elliott refused the money and demanded reconveyance of the portion she had not intended to sell. ()  
- On February 11, 1972, Russell conveyed a substantial portion of the mineral interest he had obtained from Elliott to McClelland, who later conveyed interests to Love, Harris, and Carpenter. ()  
- On February 16, 1972, Russell and his wife executed a reconveyance deed purporting to return to Elliott a 13/75ths mineral interest, corresponding to the excess interest previously conveyed. ()  
- Elliott remained unaware of Russell’s conveyances to McClelland and the subsequent transferees until October 1973, when a title search conducted in connection with a proposed new sale of mineral rights revealed the chain of title. ()  
- Elliott sued to cancel the original mineral deed to Russell on the ground that it was procured by trick and fraud and did not reflect her intent. ()  
- The trial court found that Elliott, by reason of Russell’s trick and fraud, was induced to sign a conveyance other than that which she intended, that there was no lawful delivery of the instrument, that the deed was void, and that Elliott was free from negligence. ()  
- The district court of appeal reversed, characterizing the deed as voidable rather than void, and remanded for consideration of the rights of subsequent purchasers from McClelland. ()  
- Elliott (through her representative) sought review, and the Florida Supreme Court took the case to resolve the legal status of a deed obtained by fraud and its effect on bona fide purchasers. ()  

## Issues

1. Whether a deed that is facially valid but procured by fraud in the inducement—where the grantor understands that she is signing a deed but is misled about its substantive terms—is void ab initio or merely voidable. ()  
2. Whether, if such a deed is voidable rather than void, subsequent bona fide purchasers for value without notice can acquire good legal title notwithstanding the original fraud on the grantor. ()  

## Decision

- The Florida Supreme Court held that a deed satisfying all formal legal requisites, but obtained through fraud in the inducement, is not void ab initio; it is merely voidable at the instance of the defrauded grantor. ()  
- Because such a deed is voidable and not void, it is capable of transferring legal title; therefore, a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud can obtain and retain good title. ()  
- The Court approved that portion of the district court’s decision treating the deed as voidable, but quashed any suggestion that the deed was void, and remanded for further proceedings to determine the status and good-faith nature of the subsequent purchasers’ title. ()  

## Legal Principles

- A deed that appears valid on its face and is executed with all formal legal requisites conveys legal title, even if the grantor was fraudulently induced to execute it, so long as the grantor knew she was signing a deed (fraud in the inducement, not fraud in the execution). ()  
- Fraud in the inducement renders a deed voidable at the option of the defrauded party, not void ab initio; until the deed is set aside, it operates to transfer legal title. ()  
- When an instrument is merely voidable, a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior fraud can acquire good title and is protected against later attempts by the defrauded grantor to rescind. ()  
- By contrast, a deed that is void ab initio (e.g., because of forgery or fraud in the factum where the grantor does not realize the instrument is a deed) passes no title, and no subsequent purchaser, however innocent, can acquire good title through it. The Court’s classification of the particular fraud here as inducement placed this case on the “voidable” side of that line. ()  

## Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the deed Elliott executed, though procured by Russell’s fraudulent inducement, was voidable rather than void and therefore capable of conveying legal title. This classification preserved the possibility that later bona fide purchasers from Russell’s transferee could hold good title, and the case was remanded to determine their bona fide purchaser status and the resulting allocation of rights in the disputed mineral interests. ()


McCoy v. Love, 382 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1980)