Facts
- George McCray was arrested in Chicago on January 16, 1964, and heroin was found on his person during a warrantless search incident to arrest.
- At a pretrial suppression hearing, McCray testified officers stopped and searched him without showing an arrest or search warrant.
- An arresting officer testified that a confidential informant told police McCray was selling narcotics, had narcotics on him, and could be found near a specified location at that time.
- Police went to the area; the informant identified McCray and left. Officers observed McCray’s movements and then stopped and searched him, recovering heroin.
- The State refused to disclose the informant’s identity, invoking an Illinois informant-privilege statute applicable in narcotics cases.
- Officers testified they had known the informant for one to two years and that the informant had repeatedly provided accurate narcotics information leading to many convictions.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress; McCray was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
- Whether the officers had probable cause for a warrantless arrest and search incident to arrest when their information came from an unnamed informant.
- Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment requires a state court to compel disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity at a pretrial suppression hearing limited to probable cause.
Decision
- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upholding McCray’s conviction.
- The Court held the officers had probable cause to arrest and search McCray based on the informant’s tip, the officers’ knowledge of the informant’s reliability, and corroborating circumstances.
- The Court held the Constitution imposes no absolute duty on state courts to require disclosure of an informant’s identity at a pretrial hearing addressing only probable cause where reliability and good faith are tested through adversary examination of the officers.
Legal Principles
- Probable cause may be supported by hearsay information, including informant tips, when the informant’s reliability is sufficiently shown and surrounding circumstances support the officers’ action.
- Neither the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause nor the incorporated Sixth Amendment creates a categorical constitutional rule requiring disclosure of an informant’s identity at suppression hearings confined to probable cause.
- Informant disclosure is more likely required when necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence; a probable-cause-only inquiry can permit nondisclosure if the defense can meaningfully challenge officer credibility in open court.
- State informant-privilege rules may be applied consistently with the Constitution where the suppression hearing remains adversarial and provides an opportunity to test the asserted basis for probable cause through cross-examination of the officers.
Conclusion
The Court sustained a warrantless arrest and search based on a reliable confidential informant’s tip and held that, at a suppression hearing limited to probable cause, the Constitution does not require states to disclose the informant’s identity when reliability and officer good faith are adequately examined through adversary proceedings.