## Facts

- George McCray was arrested in Chicago on January 16, 1964, and heroin was found on his person during a warrantless search incident to arrest.
- At a pretrial suppression hearing, McCray testified officers stopped and searched him without showing an arrest or search warrant.
- An arresting officer testified that a confidential informant told police McCray was selling narcotics, had narcotics on him, and could be found near a specified location at that time.
- Police went to the area; the informant identified McCray and left. Officers observed McCray’s movements and then stopped and searched him, recovering heroin.
- The State refused to disclose the informant’s identity, invoking an Illinois informant-privilege statute applicable in narcotics cases.
- Officers testified they had known the informant for one to two years and that the informant had repeatedly provided accurate narcotics information leading to many convictions.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress; McCray was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether the officers had probable cause for a warrantless arrest and search incident to arrest when their information came from an unnamed informant.
2. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment requires a state court to compel disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity at a pretrial suppression hearing limited to probable cause.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upholding McCray’s conviction.
- The Court held the officers had probable cause to arrest and search McCray based on the informant’s tip, the officers’ knowledge of the informant’s reliability, and corroborating circumstances.
- The Court held the Constitution imposes no absolute duty on state courts to require disclosure of an informant’s identity at a pretrial hearing addressing only probable cause where reliability and good faith are tested through adversary examination of the officers.

## Legal Principles

- Probable cause may be supported by hearsay information, including informant tips, when the informant’s reliability is sufficiently shown and surrounding circumstances support the officers’ action.
- Neither the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause nor the incorporated Sixth Amendment creates a categorical constitutional rule requiring disclosure of an informant’s identity at suppression hearings confined to probable cause.
- Informant disclosure is more likely required when necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence; a probable-cause-only inquiry can permit nondisclosure if the defense can meaningfully challenge officer credibility in open court.
- State informant-privilege rules may be applied consistently with the Constitution where the suppression hearing remains adversarial and provides an opportunity to test the asserted basis for probable cause through cross-examination of the officers.

## Conclusion

The Court sustained a warrantless arrest and search based on a reliable confidential informant’s tip and held that, at a suppression hearing limited to probable cause, the Constitution does not require states to disclose the informant’s identity when reliability and officer good faith are adequately examined through adversary proceedings.


McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)