## Facts

- Patricia Gile retained attorney James H. McDaniel to represent her in a marital dissolution.
- Gile alleged McDaniel used the attorney-client relationship to seek sexual favors, including requiring a form detailing intimate aspects of her personal life, making sexual remarks and calls, and physically kissing her at the courthouse.
- Gile alleged that when she refused sexual relations, McDaniel withheld or delayed legal services, including failing to act promptly when she sought a restraining order against her husband.
- Gile settled the dissolution without McDaniel’s assistance.
- McDaniel sued Gile for unpaid legal fees (about $2,362).
- Gile filed a cross-complaint asserting breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, legal malpractice, and fraud, largely based on the alleged harassment and service-related misconduct.
- The trial court granted summary adjudication against Gile on the IIED claim, concluding the alleged conduct was not “outrageous” as a matter of law and accepting defenses including Civil Code § 43.5 and limitations.
- After a bench trial on the remaining matters, the trial court entered judgment for McDaniel on both his fee claim and Gile’s cross-complaint; Gile appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether triable issues existed as to whether an attorney’s sexual harassment of a client, including withholding legal services to obtain sexual favors, can constitute “outrageous conduct” supporting an IIED claim.
2. Whether triable issues existed as to whether an attorney’s abandonment or delay in providing services after a client refuses sexual favors can fall below the professional standard of care, supporting legal malpractice.
3. Whether Civil Code § 43.5 (barring “seduction” actions) or the statute of limitations barred the IIED claim as a matter of law on summary adjudication.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the final judgment.
- The court directed the trial court to set aside the order granting summary adjudication.
- The court held triable issues existed on (1) IIED based on alleged coercion and harassment within the attorney-client relationship and (2) malpractice based on alleged abandonment and delay tied to refused sexual demands.
- The court rejected the view that Civil Code § 43.5 categorically barred the claim, because the theory was harassment/coercion and abuse of professional authority rather than “seduction.”
- The court held summary adjudication on limitations grounds was improper where factual disputes existed regarding accrual and timing in light of an alleged course of conduct during representation.

## Legal Principles

- “Outrageous conduct” for IIED is context-dependent and may be found where a defendant abuses a position of trust or authority and knowingly exploits a plaintiff’s vulnerability.
- An attorney’s conditioning of legal services on sexual favors, or delaying/withholding services for that purpose, may support IIED if a factfinder concludes the conduct exceeds what is tolerated in a civilized community.
- Alleged professional abandonment or delay in representation to pressure a client for sexual favors can fall below the standard of care and skill of the legal profession, supporting malpractice.
- Civil Code § 43.5 does not bar tort claims framed as sexual harassment/coercion and abuse of a professional relationship merely because sexual conduct is alleged.
- Summary adjudication is improper when material factual disputes exist on outrageousness, breach of professional duty, or limitations accrual.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeal held that a client’s allegations that her lawyer harassed her and withheld or delayed legal services to obtain sexual favors raised triable fact issues on IIED and malpractice, were not barred as “seduction” claims under Civil Code § 43.5, and could not be removed from the case through summary adjudication; the judgment was reversed and the matter remanded.


McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1991)