## Facts

- Damien McElrath killed his adoptive mother, Diane, in Georgia and was indicted for malice murder, felony murder (based on aggravated assault), and aggravated assault.
- At trial, McElrath relied on an insanity defense and evidence of serious mental illness.
- The jury returned mixed verdicts:
  - not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) on the malice-murder count, and
  - guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) on the felony-murder and aggravated-assault counts.
- McElrath appealed in the Georgia courts, arguing the guilty felony-murder verdict was “repugnant” to the NGRI malice-murder verdict and should be set aside.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed the verdicts were “repugnant” under Georgia’s repugnant-verdicts doctrine and vacated both murder verdicts, treating them as void, and ordered a new trial.
- On remand, McElrath filed a plea in bar, arguing the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial on malice murder because the jury had acquitted him of that count by returning an NGRI verdict.
- The trial court denied relief, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, reasoning that once the NGRI verdict was vacated as repugnant, it did not count as an acquittal for double-jeopardy purposes and retrial was permitted.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause allows retrial on malice murder after a prior NGRI verdict on that count.

## Issues

1. Whether a jury verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on a count is an “acquittal” for Double Jeopardy Clause purposes.
2. Whether a State may retry a defendant on a count after an NGRI verdict on that count when state law deems the verdict “repugnant” to other verdicts and vacates it as void.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia and remanded.
- The Court held that the jury’s NGRI verdict on malice murder was an acquittal for double-jeopardy purposes.
- Because there was an acquittal on malice murder, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars Georgia from retrying McElrath for malice murder, even if Georgia treats the verdicts as repugnant and vacates them under state law.

## Legal Principles

- For double-jeopardy purposes, an “acquittal” is defined by federal constitutional law, not by a State’s labels or procedures.
- A verdict is an acquittal when it represents a resolution in the defendant’s favor—right or wrong—of factual elements necessary for criminal guilt (including criminal responsibility).
- A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity functions as an acquittal because it reflects the jury’s determination that the State did not prove the defendant’s criminal responsibility for the charged offense.
- The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second prosecution for an offense after an acquittal; courts may not reexamine the jury’s acquittal on the ground that it conflicts with other verdicts.
- A State cannot avoid double-jeopardy consequences by characterizing an acquittal as “repugnant,” “void,” or equivalent to a mistrial.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that McElrath’s not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict on the malice-murder count was an acquittal as a matter of federal double-jeopardy law, so Georgia may not retry him for malice murder even though the State’s repugnant-verdicts doctrine led its courts to vacate the verdict as void and order a new trial.


McElrath v. Georgia, 601 U.S. 87, 144 S.Ct. 651, 217 L.Ed.2d 419 (2024)