## Facts

- Mrs. McEwen, a passenger on a train operated by Texas & Pacific Railway Company (Railway), fell and was injured while stepping down from the train at Abilene, Texas.
- A Railway employee was attempting to help Mrs. McEwen as she got off the train.
- Mrs. McEwen’s husband, J. D. McEwen, sued Railway for negligence based on the employee’s conduct in assisting her.
- The case was tried to a jury on special issues.
- The jury found the Railway employee was negligent in the way and manner he undertook to help Mrs. McEwen get off the train, and that negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries; the jury assessed damages at $2,500.
- The jury also found that when Mrs. McEwen started to get off the train, she failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and that failure was a proximate cause of her injuries (contributory negligence).
- During cross-examination, Railway asked Mrs. McEwen: “is it not a fact that you are rather fond of playing bridge?” McEwen objected: “We object to that. I do not think it is material.” The trial court overruled the objection.
- The trial court rendered judgment for Railway because the contributory-negligence finding barred recovery, and McEwen appealed, challenging the bridge-question ruling, parts of the jury charge (including “ordinary care” language), and other trial matters.

## Issues

1. Whether an objection that evidence is “not material” preserves an appellate complaint that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, regarding testimony that Mrs. McEwen was fond of playing bridge.
2. Whether alleged errors in the jury charge (including “ordinary care” language describing the carrier’s duty and claimed comments on the evidence) required reversal.
3. Whether other claimed evidentiary errors and complaints about trial proceedings were reviewable and reversible where they were not properly preserved, including by bills of exception, and where contributory negligence supported the judgment.

## Decision

- The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (Eastland) affirmed the judgment for Railway.
- The objection “I do not think it is material” was a general objection and did not preserve a complaint that the bridge-playing evidence was unfairly prejudicial or inflammatory.
- Given the jury’s finding that Mrs. McEwen’s failure to use ordinary care proximately caused her injuries, contributory negligence barred recovery; as a result, alleged errors that did not affect that dispositive finding did not justify reversal.
- Complaints about other evidence rulings or trial events were rejected where the record did not show proper preservation (including the absence of necessary bills of exception) or where any error was harmless in light of the contributory-negligence bar.

## Legal Principles

- To preserve error in admitting evidence, an objection must state a specific ground; a general objection that evidence is “not material” does not preserve a separate claim that the evidence is unfairly prejudicial.
- Under Texas law applied in this case, contributory negligence that is a proximate cause of the injury is a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.
- Appellate courts do not reverse for trial-court error that could not have changed the outcome where an independent jury finding supports the judgment.
- Complaints about excluded evidence or other trial occurrences generally require a properly made record, including timely objections and, when needed, bills of exception.

## Conclusion

McEwen sought reversal after a defense judgment in a negligence suit arising from Mrs. McEwen’s fall while stepping down from Railway’s train, but the appellate court affirmed because McEwen’s trial objection to the bridge-playing question was too general to preserve a prejudice complaint and, in any event, the jury’s contributory-negligence finding independently barred recovery, making other alleged charge and evidentiary errors non-reversible on this record.


McEwen v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 92 S.W.2d 308 (1936)