## Facts

- George “Spanky” McFarland was a former child actor who portrayed “Spanky” in the *Our Gang* comedies and became publicly known as “Spanky McFarland.”
- McFarland alleged he had long derived income from licensing and other commercial uses of the name “Spanky McFarland.”
- Joseph Miller, president and primary shareholder of Anaconda, Inc., operated a New Jersey restaurant named “Spanky McFarland’s.”
- The restaurant used McFarland’s name and imagery associated with his *Our Gang* appearance, including murals of *Our Gang* characters and character names on its menu.
- Miller admitted knowing the restaurant’s name matched the actor’s name but claimed he selected it for personal reasons unrelated to the actor.
- A 1936 agreement between McFarland’s parents (on his behalf) and Hal Roach Studios, Inc. addressed rights connected to McFarland’s work for the studio; the district court treated it as assigning superior rights in “Spanky McFarland” to the studio or its successors.
- McFarland sued for unauthorized commercial use of his name and persona (right of publicity-type claim) and for false designation of origin/unfair competition under Lanham Act § 43(a), plus related state-law theories.
- The district court granted defendants summary judgment and denied McFarland’s cross-motion; during the appeal McFarland died, and his estate’s personal representative (Doris McFarland) was substituted.

## Issues

1. Whether, under New Jersey law, a claim to prevent unauthorized commercial use of a person’s name/persona survives the person’s death and may be pursued by the estate.
2. Whether the 1936 studio agreement and the studio’s asserted character/copyright interests extinguished, as a matter of law, McFarland’s right-of-publicity and Lanham Act claims based on the combined name and persona “Spanky McFarland.”
3. Whether summary judgment for the restaurant operators was proper where the record supported a factual dispute about public association, endorsement/affiliation confusion, and the scope of any contractual assignment.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit held that a cause of action to prevent unauthorized commercial use of a person’s name/persona survives death under New Jersey law and may be maintained by the estate’s personal representative.
- The court reversed summary judgment for defendants, holding the district court erred in treating studio character ownership and the 1936 agreement as automatically defeating McFarland’s claims.
- The court held there was at least a triable issue whether “Spanky McFarland” identified McFarland as a person (his persona), not merely the fictional character, and whether the 1936 agreement clearly assigned away all such personal-name rights.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Under New Jersey law, a claim to prevent unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person’s name/persona is sufficiently property-like to survive the person’s death and may be enforced by the estate.
- Ownership of copyright or related rights in a fictional character does not, by itself, bar an actor from asserting separate rights in the actor’s own name and persona, including a name that combines a character nickname with the actor’s surname, if the public associates that identifier with the actor.
- Contractual transfers are construed by their terms; absent an unambiguous assignment, a prior studio agreement does not conclusively extinguish later-asserted persona-based claims on summary judgment.
- Use of a performer-associated name and imagery in commerce can support a Lanham Act § 43(a) claim where consumers could mistakenly believe the performer sponsored, endorsed, or was affiliated with the business; likelihood of confusion is generally a fact question.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit held that New Jersey permits post-mortem enforcement of a publicity-based claim and that studio character rights and an old studio contract did not, as a matter of law, eliminate the actor’s ability to pursue right-of-publicity and Lanham Act theories based on public association with “Spanky McFarland,” requiring reversal of defendants’ summary judgment and remand.


McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994)