## Facts

- Dianne L. McGrady financed a used 1990 Nissan through Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation under a retail installment contract.
- After McGrady fell behind on payments, a Nissan representative allegedly agreed by telephone that McGrady could cure delinquency by paying $132, which she paid.
- About ten days later, Nissan repossessed the vehicle at McGrady’s workplace; McGrady alleged the repossession was wrongful and humiliating.
- Nissan sold the vehicle and claimed a remaining deficiency of approximately $3,824.68.
- Nissan placed the claimed deficiency with Nationwide Credit, Inc., a third-party collection agency.
- Nationwide sent demand letters and repeatedly called McGrady at home and work; McGrady described calls as rude and harassing.
- McGrady sent Nationwide a written request that further communications occur only by mail, but Nationwide allegedly continued calling for roughly two months.
- McGrady sued Nissan for conversion and Alabama U.C.C. Article 9 violations related to repossession and sale, and sued Nissan and Nationwide under the FDCPA.
- The case was removed to federal court; Nissan and Nationwide moved for summary judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether Nissan, as a creditor collecting its own account, qualified as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and could be liable for FDCPA violations.
2. Whether Nationwide’s alleged calling practices and failure to honor McGrady’s written request to limit communications created triable FDCPA claims.
3. Whether factual disputes about the repossession and disposition of collateral precluded summary judgment on McGrady’s Alabama conversion and Article 9 claims against Nissan.

## Decision

- Nissan’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part.
- The court granted summary judgment to Nissan on the FDCPA claim, holding Nissan was a creditor and not a statutory “debt collector.”
- The court denied summary judgment to Nissan on at least some state-law claims (conversion and/or Article 9 claims), finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding repossession and sale conduct.
- Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
- The court held the record could support FDCPA liability against Nationwide, including claims based on alleged harassment and continued calls after a written request restricting communications.

## Legal Principles

- A creditor collecting its own debt is generally excluded from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector,” absent a statutory exception (such as using a name other than its own or otherwise meeting an exception in the definition).
- A third-party collection agency collecting debts owed to another ordinarily falls within the FDCPA’s coverage as a “debt collector.”
- Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, repeated or abusive collection calls may support a claim if their natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse.
- Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c), a debt collector generally must stop most communications after receiving a consumer’s written notice to cease or limit communications; continued calls after such notice can create liability.
- Under Alabama law, repossession conduct may support a conversion claim if undertaken without lawful justification or beyond contractual or statutory rights.
- Under Alabama’s U.C.C. Article 9, disposition of repossessed collateral must comply with statutory requirements (including commercial reasonableness and required notices), and noncompliance may affect deficiency recovery and support debtor remedies.
- On summary judgment, disputes over material facts regarding agreements, repossession circumstances, notice, sale practices, and collection communications must be resolved by a factfinder.

## Conclusion

The court dismissed the FDCPA claim against Nissan because it was a creditor rather than a statutory “debt collector,” but allowed McGrady’s repossession-related state claims to proceed due to factual disputes, and denied Nationwide summary judgment because the evidence could support FDCPA violations based on alleged harassment and continued calls after written notice restricting communications.


McGrady v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Ala. 1998)