## Facts

- Francis X. McLaughlin, an attorney acting pro se, represented a creditor in bankruptcy matters involving Winthrop Lawrence Corporation and Lammot du Pont Copeland, Jr.
- Copeland Jr. was a Chapter XI debtor in Wilmington; E. Norman Veasey and his firm represented Copeland Jr. in that proceeding.
- During the bankruptcy litigation, McLaughlin made assertions about allegedly fraudulent conduct by the Copelands and indicated an intent to file a creditors’ class action against Copeland Sr., Copeland Jr., and others.
- After a meeting concerning settlement of the creditor’s claim, Veasey prepared a memorandum and letter accusing McLaughlin of “extortion” and professional misconduct and sent them to the bankruptcy judge and participating attorneys.
- The bankruptcy judge referred the matter to Delaware disciplinary authorities; the disciplinary board later found insufficient evidence of a rules violation.
- McLaughlin filed a tort suit alleging the Copelands and Veasey conspired to discredit and defame him to deter litigation against them; the case was transferred to the District of Delaware.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim; McLaughlin sought leave to amend.

## Issues

1. Whether an attorney’s communications to a judge and counsel, made in connection with a pending judicial proceeding and related to that proceeding, are absolutely privileged against defamation-based tort liability.
2. Whether a civil conspiracy claim can proceed when the only pleaded overt acts are privileged litigation communications and the remaining allegations are conclusory.
3. Whether leave to amend should be granted when the proposed amendment does not add non-privileged, actionable conduct and would be futile.

## Decision

- The court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions and dismissed the complaint.
- The court held Veasey’s letter and memorandum to the bankruptcy judge and counsel were absolutely privileged because they were made in the course of, and related to, a judicial proceeding.
- The court ruled that re-labeling the same privileged communications as “conspiracy” did not avoid the privilege; conclusory allegations of a broader scheme, without specific non-privileged acts, failed to state a claim.
- The court denied McLaughlin’s motion for leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

## Legal Principles

- Communications made by attorneys preliminary to, or during, judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged against defamation and related tort claims if they have some relation to the proceeding.
- Absolute litigation privilege applies even if the statements are allegedly false or malicious, unless they are wholly unrelated to the litigation.
- A conspiracy claim fails when all alleged acts in furtherance are privileged or otherwise non-actionable; conclusory allegations without specific actionable conduct are insufficient to plead a claim.
- Leave to amend may be denied where the proposed amendment would not overcome a dispositive privilege and therefore cannot state a viable claim.

## Conclusion

The court dismissed claims alleging that opposing counsel and related parties defamed and conspired against an attorney by reporting alleged misconduct to the bankruptcy judge and counsel, holding such litigation-related communications absolutely privileged and finding amendment futile absent non-privileged actionable acts.


McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F. Supp. 749 (D. Del. 1978)