## Facts

- A road traffic collision, caused by the defendants’ admitted negligence, seriously injured the claimant’s husband and two children and killed her third child.
- The claimant was at home about two miles away and learned of the accident about one to two hours later.
- She was driven to the hospital, where she was told her child had died and saw her husband and children in a distressed, injured, and dirt-covered condition.
- The claimant developed severe psychiatric illness, including depression and personality change, alleged to have been caused by the traumatic experience.
- The trial court dismissed the claim, concluding psychiatric injury to the claimant was not reasonably foreseeable and no duty was owed.
- The appellate court affirmed dismissal on varying rationales, including limiting duty to persons on or near the highway and restricting recovery on policy grounds.

## Issues

1. Whether a negligent driver owes a duty of care for psychiatric injury to a close relative who was not at the accident scene but encounters the immediate aftermath shortly thereafter.
2. What proximity limits (relationship, time/space closeness, and mode of perception) govern recovery for negligently caused psychiatric injury to a “secondary victim.”
3. How policy concerns should affect the existence and scope of duty where psychiatric harm is arguably foreseeable.

## Decision

- The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal and held the claimant could recover damages for her psychiatric illness.
- A duty of care may extend to a close relative who comes upon the immediate aftermath of a negligently caused accident, even if not present at the moment of impact.
- The claimant satisfied proximity requirements: close family relationship, temporal/spatial closeness to the accident’s aftermath, and psychiatric injury induced by direct perception of its consequences at the hospital.
- The case was remitted for assessment of damages.

## Legal Principles

- Reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric harm is necessary but not sufficient; liability also depends on a legally recognized proximity between defendant and claimant.
- Courts may limit recovery for psychiatric injury by reference to:
  - the class of claimant (typically close ties of love and affection);
  - proximity in time and space to the event or its immediate aftermath; and
  - the means by which shock is caused (generally direct perception rather than indirect reports).
- “Immediate aftermath” can fall within the actionable event for psychiatric-injury claims, so presence at the accident scene is not an absolute requirement.
- Policy considerations may inform principled limits on duty, but do not justify a blanket exclusion where claimant status and proximity place the claim within controlled boundaries.

## Conclusion

The House of Lords recognized that a close relative who suffers psychiatric illness after directly encountering the immediate aftermath of a negligently caused accident may recover in negligence, using relationship, time/space proximity, and mode of perception to confine liability.


McLoughlin v. O’Brian, [1983] 1 A.C. 410 (H.L.)