Facts
- Mrs. McLoughlin suffered severe psychiatric illness after learning of a car accident involving her husband and three children.
- The accident occurred at around 4 p.m.; at approximately 6 p.m., Mrs. McLoughlin was informed by a neighbor.
- She arrived at the hospital and witnessed her daughter's death and the serious injuries suffered by her husband and other children.
- Mrs. McLoughlin claimed her psychiatric shock and subsequent depression resulted from this experience.
- She brought a negligence claim against the driver and owner of the lorry involved in the collision, alleging a duty of care despite not being present at the accident.
- The central factual issue was whether a defendant could be liable in negligence for psychiatric harm suffered by a secondary victim who was not directly involved in the incident but arrived at its immediate aftermath.
Issues
- Whether the defendants owed a duty of care to Mrs. McLoughlin as a secondary victim for the psychiatric harm suffered.
- Whether foreseeability alone was sufficient to establish liability, or whether additional requirements (such as relationship, proximity in time and space, and direct perception) were necessary.
- What criteria must be satisfied for a claim in negligence for psychiatric harm by a person not directly involved in or present at the accident.
Decision
- The House of Lords held that foreseeability of psychiatric harm was not alone sufficient to impose a duty of care to secondary victims.
- The court established additional requirements: a close relationship between claimant and primary victim, proximity to the event or its immediate aftermath, and direct perception (by sight or hearing) of the event or its consequences.
- Mrs. McLoughlin’s claim succeeded, as she satisfied these criteria.
- Lord Wilberforce articulated the three-part test as controlling liability for psychiatric harm in such cases.
- The alternative, less restrictive approach, advocated by Lord Bridge (relying on foreseeability alone), was not adopted by the majority.
Legal Principles
- Liability for psychiatric harm in negligence to secondary victims requires more than foreseeability.
- Lord Wilberforce’s three-part test requires:
- A close tie of love and affection between claimant and primary victim (typically parent/child or spouse).
- Proximity in time and space to the event or its immediate aftermath.
- Direct perception (sight or sound) of the distressing event or its aftermath.
- Mere bystanders or individuals told about the event by third parties are generally excluded from recovery.
- The duty of care to secondary victims is narrowly drawn to prevent unlimited liability.
- The approach in this case was later reaffirmed in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310.
Conclusion
McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 established that secondary victims seeking compensation for psychiatric harm in negligence must satisfy a three-part test: a close relationship with the primary victim, proximity to the incident or its immediate aftermath, and direct perception of the event. Foreseeability alone is not enough, thereby limiting the scope of defendants' liability for psychiatric injury in English negligence law.